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A patient seller faces a sequence of buyers and decides whether to build a reputation for supplying high
quality products. Each buyer does not have access to the seller’s complete records, but can observe
all previous buyers’ actions, and some informative private signal about the seller’s actions. I examine
how the private signals the buyers receive affect the speed of social learning and the seller’s incentives
to establish reputations. When each buyer privately observes a bounded (possibly stochastic) subset
of the seller’s past actions, the speed of social learning is strictly positive but can vanish to zero as the
seller becomes patient. As a result, reputation building leads to low payoff for the patient seller and
low social welfare. When each buyer observes an unboundedly informative private signal about the
seller’s current-period action, the speed of learning is uniformly bounded below and a patient seller
can secure high returns from building reputations. My results provide an explanation to empirical
findings of reputation failures in developing countries. I also discuss the effectiveness of various policies
in accelerating social learning and encouraging sellers to establish good reputations.
Keywords: social learning, reputation, stochastic network, information aggregation.
JEL Codes: C73, D82, D83
1 Introduction
Recent empirical findings in developing economies suggest that reputation mechanisms fail to function
in a variety of markets. In the markets for experience goods, such as malaria drugs (Nyqvist, Svensson
and Yanagizawa-Drott 2018), fruits (Bai 2018), and milk powder (Bai, Gazze and Wang 2019), there is
a lack of supply for high quality products despite consumers’ demands for high quality. A common rea-
son behind these market failures is the persistent mistrust between sellers and consumers. Consumers
believe that sellers are likely to supply low quality. This pessimistic belief lowers sellers’ returns from
building reputations and makes consumers’ pessimistic beliefs self-fulfilling. These observations are at
odds with the canonical reputation results in Fudenberg and Levine (1989,1992), which suggest that
buyers’ mistrust cannot persist and patient sellers can secure high returns from building reputations.
This paper presents a reputation model, which, among other results, suggests a rationale for such
reputation failures and persistent mistrust. I argue that when each consumer has limited access to a
∗Department of Economics, Northwestern University. I thank Daron Acemoglu, Alp Atakan, Jie Bai, Dhruva Bhaskar,
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seller’s past records (e.g., observes a bounded subset of the seller’s past actions), and learns primarily
from previous consumers’ choices, consumers’ learning can be arbitrarily slow. This can wipe out
the seller’s returns from building reputations no matter how patient he is. I also propose policy
interventions that can accelerate social learning and restore seller’s incentives to sustain reputations.
My modeling assumptions, limited access to sellers’ past records and learning from others’ choices,
fit into a number of retail markets in developing economies. Limited availability of formal records can
be caused by inadequate record-keeping technologies. Even when official records are available, their
credibility is undermined by institutional failures such as collusion between merchants and bureaucrats.
As a result, information about the seller’s past actions is dispersed among consumers (e.g., each
consumer observes the quality of product she bought from the seller), and can be passed on to future
buyers via word-of-mouth communication. These patterns of learning are documented empirically in
the markets for fertilizers (Conley and Udry 2010), drugs (Adhvaryu 2014), food (Bai 2018), etc.
Can consumers’ social learning provide adequate incentives for sellers to supply high quality? How
does the speed of learning depend on consumers’ private signals? For example, does a seller have
stronger reputational incentives when each consumer observes his actions in the last 10 periods (i.e.,
after selling a low quality product, a seller will be punished by the next 10 consumers), or when each
consumer observes some informative signal about his current-period action? The answers to these
questions not only help to understand the causes of reputation failures, but also inform policy-makers
about which additional information to provide to consumers in order to restore efficiency.1
Motivated by these questions, I study an infinitely repeated game between a patient player 1 (e.g.,
seller) and a sequence of player 2s (e.g., consumers), arriving one in each period and each plays the
game only once. Player 1 is either a strategic type who maximizes his discounted average payoff,
or a commitment type who plays his optimal (pure) commitment action in every period. I focus on
situations in which the commitment type occurs with small but positive probability.
My modeling innovation is in the monitoring structure. In my baseline model, every player 2
observes the entire history of previous player 2s’ actions, and observes player 1’s actions in the last
K periods. In Section 4, I extend my result when player 2s are connected via a bounded stochastic
network, each player 2 observes player 1’s actions against her neighbors, in addition to player 2s’
1An obvious solution to the reputation failure problem is to let each consumer observe the seller’s complete records.
However, such a policy is hard to implement in developing countries due to its violation of two constraints. First, budget
and institutional constraints which rule out policies that require formidable implementation costs or those that require
radical changes in the current institutions. Second, consumers’ inattention constraints which limit each consumer’s
capacity to process detailed information about the seller’s actions. Policies that respect these constraints include: (1)
marginal improvements in record-keeping technologies that allow each consumer to observe a longer history of the seller’s
past actions; (2) inspect a small fraction of products currently sold on the market and provide quality certificates.
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actions in all previous periods. This setup resembles many retail markets in developing countries.
Given the geographic proximity, consumers can casually observe each other’s actions in these localized
markets for food, drugs, and fertilizers. However, learning about the seller’s actions (i.e., the quality
and attributes of his product) requires more time and effort. For example, a consumer needs to talk to
his neighbors in person and learn about their personal experiences. It is usually the case that she has
limited capacity to process such detailed information. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that each
consumer communicates with at most a bounded number of individuals before making her decision.
Theorem 1 shows that no matter how large K is, there exist equilibria in which the patient player’s
payoff is no more than his worst stage-game Nash Equilibrium payoff.2 In monotone-supermodular
games (Condition 2) that fit into buyer-seller applications, there exist equilibria in which both players
receive their respective minmax payoffs (Theorem 2). My reputation failure result generalizes when
each short-run player randomly samples a bounded subset of her predecessors,3 observes the patient
player’s actions against the individuals in her sample, in addition to all of her predecessors’ actions
(Theorem 3). These results contrast to the ones in Fudenberg and Levine (1989, 1992), which suggest
that a patient player can secure his optimal commitment payoff in all equilibria.
My proofs of these results construct a class of sequential equilibria in which the speed of player 2s’
learning is strictly positive, but vanishes to zero as player 1’s discount factor approaches unity. Section
2 illustrates the intuition behind my constructive proofs using the product choice game in Mailath
and Samuelson (2001), and applies my results to a case study in the fruit market (Bai 2018).
In order to confirm that the driving force behind Theorem 1 is slow learning, rather than alternative
mechanisms proposed in the social learning and reputation literature, I establish three properties that
apply to all Bayes Nash Equilibria. These findings highlight the new economic forces that affect the
speed of learning when the learning process is endogenously controlled by a strategic long-run player.
First, player 2s never herd on any action that does not best reply against player 1’s commitment
action. Intuitively, player 1 has no intertemporal incentive after player 2s herd, and hence, plays a
myopic best reply against that herding action. Suppose player 1’s myopic best reply is his commitment
action, then player 2s will best reply against player 1’s commitment action. Suppose player 1’s best
reply is not his commitment action, then player 2s believe that player 1 is the commitment type after
observing him playing the commitment action, and therefore, will best reply against the commitment
2My results apply to every game that has a pure strategy Nash Equilibrium and satisfies a generic payoff assumption.
I also provide sufficient conditions under which the patient player attains his minmax payoff.
3Theorem 3 requires two additional assumptions on the stochastic network. First, the neighborhoods of different
player 2s are independent random variables. This is a standard assumption in social learning models, which is also
assumed in Banerjee and Fudenberg (2004) and Acemoglu, Dahleh, Lobel and Ozdaglar (2011). Second, the probability
with which each player 2 can observe player 1’s action against her immediate predecessor is bounded from below.
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action in the next period. Both conclusions contradict the presumption on player 2s’ herding.
Using similar ideas, I show that when players’ stage-game payoffs are monotone-supermodular, (1)
player 2s’ actions in the next K periods are informative about player 1’s current-period action unless
player 1 is guaranteed to receive his optimal commitment payoff in the next K periods; (2) player 1’s
asymptotic payoff from establishing a reputation is at least a fraction K
K+1 of his optimal commitment
payoff. These findings suggest that Theorem 1 is not driven by low-payoff outcomes in the long run,
or player 2s’ actions being uninformative, which stands in contrast to models of bad reputations.
Section 5 examines an alternative specification of player 2s’ private information: Every player 2
observes an informative private signal about player 1’s current period action, in addition to previous
player 2s’ actions, and possibly, player 1’s actions in the last K ∈ N∪{0} periods. This is motivated by
policy interventions in which a regulator randomly inspects a small fraction of products currently sold
on the market and informs consumers about the quality of inspected products by issuing certificates.
Theorem 4 shows that in games where player 1’s action choice is binary, he can secure his com-
mitment payoff in all equilibria if and only if player 2’s private signal is unboundedly informative,
i.e., there exists a signal realization that occurs with positive probability only when player 1 plays his
commitment action. This is reminiscent of a result in Smith and Sørensen (2000), that agents’ actions
asymptotically match the state if and only if their private signals are unboundedly informative.
However, Smith and Sørensen (2000)’s result does not imply that player 1 can secure high payoffs
from building reputations. This is because first, the myopic players in my model are learning about
the endogenous actions of a strategic player rather than an exogenous state. Second, converging to a
high-payoff outcome asymptotically does not imply that a patient patient receives a high discounted
average payoff. This is demonstrated by the comparison between Theorem 1 and Proposition 3.
The key step to establish Theorem 4 is to show that in binary action games, unboundedly infor-
mative private signal guarantees a lower bound on the speed of social learning, which is independent
of player 1’s discount factor. After observing previous player 2s’ actions but before observing her
private signal, if player 2 believes that she will not best reply against the commitment action with
positive probability, then the probability with which she best replies against the commitment action is
strictly higher when player 1 plays his commitment action. As a result, the informativeness of player
2’s action does not vanish as player 1 becomes arbitrarily patient, which implies that a patient player
1 can secure his commitment payoff by building a reputation.
When player 1 has three or more actions, player 2’s private signal being unboundedly informative
is neither necessary nor sufficient for player 1 to secure high returns from building reputations. I show
this by counterexample in which player 2’s action is uninformative about player 1’s action even when
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she does not best reply against the commitment action with positive probability.
Nevertheless, the equivalence between securing high returns from building reputations and un-
boundedly informative signals is restored when players’ payoffs are monotone-supermodular and the
distribution over private signals satisfies a monotone likelihood ratio property (i.e., the likelihood ratio
between a high signal realization and a low signal realization is higher when the seller takes a higher
action), both of which are reasonable assumptions in the buyer-seller application. Under these condi-
tions, Theorem 4’ shows that player 2’s private signal being unboundedly informative is sufficient and
almost necessary for a patient player to secure his commitment payoff from building reputations.
In terms of policy implications, Theorems 4 and 4’ suggest that in markets with lack of record keep-
ing and consumers relying on social learning and word-of-mouth communication, providing consumers
with informative signals about the quality of products currently sold on the market can effectively
encourage sellers to supply high quality. For this intervention to be effective, the regulator needs
to ensure that quality certificates cannot be forged, and in particular, the certificate for high quality
products cannot be used on low quality ones (i.e., the signal is unboundedly informative). By contrast,
Theorem 1 suggests that allowing consumers to observe a longer history of the seller’s past actions
(but remains bounded) is ineffective provided there is widespread mistrust between buyers and sellers.
Related Literature: This paper contributes to the social learning literature from two angles.
In terms of modeling, I study a social learning model in which a sequence of myopic players
learn about a strategic long-run player’s endogenous behavior. This contrasts to the canonical social
learning models of Banerjee (1992), Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1992), and Smith and
Sørensen (2000), in which myopic players learn about an exogenous state.4
In terms of research question, I examine the effects of social learning on a patient player’s discounted
average payoff. This is novel compared to existing models that focus on players’ asymptotic beliefs
(Banerjee 1992, Bikhchandani et al.1992 and Smith and Sørensen 2000), asymptotic rates of learning
(Gale and Kariv 2003, Harel, et al. 2019), and asymptotic payoffs (Rosenberg and Vieille 2019).
My model yields new insights and predictions. Due to the long-run player’s incentive constraints
and the presence of commitment type, the myopic players never herd on any action that does not best
reply against the commitment action. Moreover, whether the long-run player can secure high returns
from building reputations depends on the minimal rate of learning that is consistent with his incentive
constraints. In particular, whether this minimal rate goes to zero as he becomes arbitrarily patient.
4Players are also learning about some exogenous state in the recent works of Mossel, Sly and Tamuz (2015), Rosenberg
and Vieille (2019), and Harel, Mossel, Strack and Tamuz (2019). Jackson and Kalai (1997) study recurring games in
which a sequence of myopic players learn about the exogenous distribution over types in some populations.
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This paper contributes to the reputation literature by establishing reputation results in envi-
ronments with social learning (Theorems 4 and 4). To the best of my knowledge, this has not been
explored before. My Theorems 1 and 3 identify a new mechanism that accounts for several instances of
reputation failures. In particular, reputation fails since the speed of learning vanishes as the reputation-
building player becomes patient. This differs from existing theories that are based on the uninformed
player’s forward-looking incentives, or the lack-of identification of the informed player’s actions.
Models with lack-of identification such as Ely and Va¨lima¨ki (2003), Ely, Fudenberg and Levine
(2008), and Deb, Mitchell and Pai (2019) focus on participation games, in which the uninformed
player(s) can take a non-participating action under which the public signal is uninformative about the
informed player’s current period action. In Levine (2019), the signals are less informative when the
uninformed players do not participate. These features contrast to my model in which the uninformed
players’ actions cannot prevent her successors from observing the informed player’s current period
action, and their actions are informative about the informed player’s past actions (Proposition 2).
Cripps and Thomas (1997) and Chan (2000) construct low-payoff equilibria when players are
equally patient and the uninformed player can observe the entire history of the informed player’s
actions. In their models as well as other models with complete records, the informed player’s patience
helps reputation building while the uninformed player’s patience hurts reputation building. In my
model, the uninformed players are short-lived, and it is the informed player’s patience that decreases
the rate of learning and causes reputations to fail.
My paper is also related to reputation models with bounded memories, such as Ekmekci (2011), Liu
(2011), Liu and Skrzypacz (2014), and Kaya and Roy (2020). These papers study reputation games in
which every short-run player observes a bounded sequence of the long-run player’s past actions, but
cannot observe each others’ actions. This assumption rules out the possibility of social learning. By
contrast, my paper studies the effects of social learning on a patient player’s reputational incentives,
as well as policy interventions that can accelerate social learning and motivate reputation building.
Logina, Lukyanov and Shamruk (2019) study a reputation model in which every myopic buyer
observes an informative signal about a patient seller’s current period action, in addition to all previous
buyers’ actions. They focus on stage games in which the seller’s optimal commitment payoff equals his
minmax payoff. They compute Markov Perfect Equilibria in which the seller prefers to work when his
reputation is intermediate, and prefers to shirk otherwise. Intuitively, a seller has no incentive to work
when buyers’ belief about his type is sufficiently precise. By contrast, my results are driven by the low
rate of social learning, which apply to games where player 1 can strictly benefit from commitment.
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2 Illustrative Example: Product Choice Game
I illustrate my model using the product choice game in Mailath and Samuelson (2001). This game
fits into retail markets with asymmetric information, widespread mistrust between buyers and sellers,
and lack of formal records. As a result, buyers acquire information from other consumers, such as
observing others’ choices and learning about others’ personal experiences.
I use the watermelon retail market studied in Bai (2018) as a concrete example to demonstrate the
fitness of my model and to explain the implications of my results. Readers who are interested in the
formal illustration of the model and results can jump to Section 3.
Product Choice Game: A patient seller with discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1) interacts with an infinite
sequence of buyers, arriving one in each period and each has unit demand in the period she arrives.
In every period, the seller chooses between high (H) and low (L) effort, that determines the quality
of his product. Each buyer decides whether to trust the seller (T ) or not (N). Players’ payoffs are:
– T N
H 2, 1 −1, 0
L 3,−1 0, 0
The seller is either a commitment type who exerts high effort (or equivalently, supplies high quality)
in every period, or a strategic type who chooses effort in order to maximize his payoff.
Each individual buyer cannot observe the quality of product sold in the current period, but can
observe all previous buyers’ choices. Moreover, she can sample a bounded subset of previous buyers
and learn about the quality of products they bought from the seller. Both deterministic sampling
(Section 3) and stochastic sampling (Section 4) are considered.
Case Study: I map my model into the watermelon retail market studied in Bai (2018). My assump-
tions fit into this market since there is significant asymmetric information about the quality of melons
between buyers and sellers, and quality varies considerably across melons sold by a given seller.
I interpret a consumer’s action T as purchasing a melon from a premium pile that is sold at a higher
price, andN as purchasing from a standard pile that is sold at a lower price. Consumers cannot observe
the quality of a melon before buying.5 However, they can observe quality after consumption, and can
pass this information to future consumers via word-of-mouth communication.
5According to Bai (2018), watermelons are usually sold as a whole since cut melons are hard to preserve in hot weather.
Consumers cannot detect the fruit’s true quality by inspecting the outside. As a result, the quality of a watermelon is a
classic example of experience quality defined in Nelson (1970), which refers to aspects of quality that a consumer cannot
observe before consumption but can learn after consumption.
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In comparison, sellers have the expertise to distinguish the quality of melons. I interpret the seller’s
action as his effort on sorting when he procures melons from the wholesale market, which is either
high or low. High effort can improve the quality of his melons both in the premium pile and in the
standard pile. Similar to other retail markets in developing countries, there is no official record that
documents the seller’s behavior in each transaction. Since the retail market is highly localized and is
frequently visited by people in the neighborhood, consumers can casually observe others’ purchasing
decisions, and can learn about the quality of melons bought by some previous buyers.
Benchmark: When every buyer can observe the complete history of the seller’s actions, Fudenberg
and Levine (1989)’s result suggests that in every equilibrium, a patient seller receives at least his
commitment payoff from exerting high effort (equals 2). Whether previous buyers’ actions are observed
is irrelevant. Intuitively, observing the seller’s past actions guarantees a minimal speed of learning :
In every period where a consumer has an incentive to choose N , she believes that H will be played
with probability less than 1/2. As a result, the probability she attaches to the commitment type is
multiplied by 2 after she observes the seller choosing H. Therefore, as long as the seller chooses H in
every period, consumers will trust the seller in all except for a bounded number of periods.
Reputation Failure Result: Suppose each consumer does not have access to the seller’s complete
records, but instead observes all previous consumers’ choices, and the seller’s actions in the last K
periods. Can social learning provide adequate incentives for a patient seller to supply high quality?
I show that reputation fails in the sense that there exist equilibria in which the seller’s payoff is
zero no matter how patient he is and no matter how large K is (Theorem 1). This result generalizes
when buyers randomly sample among other buyers (Theorem 3). Those equilibria lead to low social
welfare since buyers’ discounted average payoff is also close to their minmax payoff 0 (Theorem 2).
Interestingly, reputation fails not because buyers herd on the non-trusting action N (Proposition
1), and moreover, buyers’ actions are informative about the seller’s past actions (Proposition 2). In
fact, as long as the seller plays H in every period, the asymptotic frequency of outcome (H,T ) is at
least K
K+1 (Proposition 3). This suggests that in all equilibria, the seller’s asymptotic payoff from
building a reputation is close to his optimal commitment payoff when K is large enough.
Instead, reputation failure is caused by slow learning: the rate with which play converges to the
trusting outcome (H,T ) goes to zero as the seller becomes patient. This suggests a rationale for
a finding in Bai (2018), that in the baseline setting without policy interventions, mistrust between
consumers and sellers persists for a long time, buyers’ choices respond slowly to their acquaintances’
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past experiences, and sellers exert little effort on sorting to improve the quality of their melons.6
The constructive proof of my result reflects the logic behind these empirical results. For an informal
illustration, consider an equilibrium that consists of a non-trusting phase and a trusting phase. These
phases translate into two self-fulfilling social norms: one in which buyers do not trust the seller and
the seller supplies high quality with low probability, another one in which buyers trust the seller and
the seller supplies high quality with high probability.
Play starts from the non-trusting phase, and enters the trusting phase after the seller has been
trusted by some previous buyers.7 The probability with which play enters the trusting phase (which
I call, the rate of trust building) depends on the seller’s effort in the period before. This probability is
zero if the seller supplied low quality, and is strictly positive if the seller supplied high quality.
What is the rate of trusting building when the seller supplied high quality in the period before?
When this probability is too low, the strategic type finds it not worthwhile to exert high effort.
Therefore, the seller will have a perfect reputation by exerting high effort for one period, which leads
to a high rate of learning. When this probability is too high, the strategic type finds it strictly optimal
to pool with the commitment type. As a result, the seller’s reputation remains unchanged even when
she exerts high effort, which leads to a low rate of learning.
The above reasoning pins down the equilibrium rate of trust building, which is the one that makes
the strategic type seller indifferent between supplying low and high quality. As the seller becomes
more patient, the equilibrium rate of learning decreases. Intuitively, when a buyer observes the seller
supplying high quality in the non-trusting phase, he becomes more skeptical about the seller motives
when the strategic type has stronger incentives to imitate the commitment type. This endogenously
prolongs the trust building process and eliminates the seller’s returns from a good reputation.
Policy Implications: Which policies can motivate sellers to supply high quality? I compare the
performance of two commonly used policies: (1) improve record keeping, which allows each buyer to
observe a longer history of the seller’s past actions; (2) randomly inspect a small fraction of products
that are currently sold on the market, and provide quality certificates to the ones with high-quality.
Under the second policy, the current-period buyer can observe the quality certificate and therefore,
can identify high-quality products with low but positive probability.
Theorem 4 suggests that random inspection successfully restores a patient seller’s reputation build-
6Bai’s structural estimation of the seller’s discount factor rejects the hypothesis that reputation fails due to the seller’s
impatience. In her randomized control trial, sellers who were assigned with a laser-tag machine have strong incentives
to build reputations. This also rejects the hypothesis that reputation failure is caused by the seller’s impatience.
7The presence of commitment type implies that play cannot remain in the non-trusting phase in the long run. See
Proposition 3 for a formal statement.
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ing incentives in all equilibria. This is the case despite each quality certificate is observed only by the
current-period buyer, and each product receives the certificate with low probability. This contrasts
to Theorem 1 which implies that improved record keeping (an increase in K) is ineffective when the
initial trust level between buyers and sellers is low (i.e., prior probability of commitment type is low).
Interestingly, random inspections can restore patient seller’s reputational incentives if and only if
the consumer’s private signal is unbounedly informative about the seller’s commitment action,8 i.e.,
the certificate given to the high quality products cannot be forged and cannot be used on low quality
ones. Intuitively, when buyers’ prior belief attaches low enough probability to the commitment type
seller, and entertains the adverse belief that the strategic-type seller is likely to exert low effort, they
have an incentive not to trust the seller after they observe a boundedly informative signal.
This result provides an explanation to Bai’s findings in her randomized control trial. Among
the group of sellers who are provided with novel laser-cut labels, most of them exert high effort in
sorting when procuring melons from the wholesale market, and trust is gradually built between these
sellers and their buyers. Among the group of sellers who are provided with sticker labels that can be
counterfeited, the outcomes are similar to the baseline setting in which sellers are reluctant to build
reputations and consumers’ skepticism about these sellers’ product quality persists over time.
3 Reputation Failure under Social Learning
Primitives: Time is discrete, indexed by t = 0, 1, 2.... A long-lived player 1 (he, e.g., seller) with
discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1) interacts with an infinite sequence of short-lived player 2s (she, e.g., buyers),
arriving one in each period and each plays the game only once. In period t, players simultaneously
choose their actions at and bt from finite sets A and B. Players have access to a public randomization
device. Let ξt be its realization in period t, which is uniformly distributed on [0, 1].
Players’ stage-game payoffs are u1(at, bt) and u2(at, bt). Let BR1 : ∆(B) ⇒ 2
A\{∅} and BR2 :
∆(A) ⇒ 2B\{∅} be player 1’s and player 2’s best reply correspondences in the stage-game. The
set of player 1’s (pure) Stackelberg actions is argmaxa∈A
{
minb∈BR2(a) u1(a, b)
}
. I introduce two
assumptions on players’ stage-game payoffs:
Assumption 1. BR1(b) is a singleton for every b ∈ B. BR2(a) is a singleton for every a ∈ A.
Player 1 has a unique pure Stackelberg action.
8The difference between my result and the well-known result of Smith and Sørensen (2000) is explained in the intro-
duction. The equivalence between unboundedly informative signal and securing high payoffs from building reputations
holds when the long-run player has two actions, or when stage-game payoffs are monotone-supermodular and the signal
distribution satisfies a monotone likelihood ratio condition. See Theorems 4 and 4’ in Section 5 for details.
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A sufficient condition for Assumption 1 is that ui(a, b) 6= ui(a
′, b′) for every i ∈ {1, 2} and (a, b) 6=
(a′, b′). This is satisfied for generic (u1, u2) given that A and B are finite sets. Let a
∗ be player 1’s
pure Stackelberg action. Let b∗ ∈ B be the unique element in BR2(a
∗), which I refer to as player 2’s
Stackelberg best reply. Let u1(a
∗, b∗) be player 1’s Stackelberg payoff.
Assumption 2. There exists a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in the stage-game.
Under Assumption 2, player 1’s pure Stackelberg payoff is weakly greater than his payoff in any
pure-strategy Nash Equilibrium. This assumption is satisfied in most of the games studied in the
reputation literature, such as product choice games, chain store games, and common interest games.
It rules out rock-paper-scissors and other games in which commitment to pure actions is not beneficial.
Information & Monitoring Structure: Player 1 has persistent private information about his
type, which is constant over time and is denoted by ω ∈ {ωs, ωc}. In particular, ωc stands for a
commitment type who mechanically plays a∗ in every period, and ωs stands for a strategic type who
can flexibly choose his actions in order to maximize his payoff.
Player 1 can observe the all the actions taken in the past in addition to the current and past
realizations of public randomization devices. Let ht1 be a typical private history of the strategic-type
player 1 in period t, with ht1 ≡ {a0, ..., at−1, b0, ..., bt−1, ξ0, ..., ξt}. Let H
t
1 be the set of h
t
1 and let
H1 ≡ ∪
∞
t=0H
t
1. Strategic-type player 1’s strategy is σ1 : H1 → ∆(A), with σ1 ∈ Σ1.
Player 2’s prior belief attaches probability π0 ∈ (0, 1) to the commitment type ω
c. Her private
history coincides with the public history, which consists of all of her predecessors’ actions, player
1’s actions in the past K ∈ {1, 2, 3, ...} periods, and the current realization of public randomization
device.9 The exogenous parameter K measures player 2’s capacity to process detailed information
about player 1’s past actions.10 Let ht be the public history in period t, with
ht ≡

 {b0, b1, ..., bt−1, at−K , at−K+1, ..., at−1, ξt} if t ≥ K{b0, b1, ..., bt−1, a0, a1, ..., at−1, ξt} if t < K.
Let Ht be the set of ht and let H ≡ ∪∞t=0H
t. Player 2’s strategy is σ2 : H → ∆(B), with σ2 ∈ Σ2. Let
π(ht) be the probability that player 2’s belief at ht attaches to the commitment type, which I refer to
as player 1’s reputation at ht.
9My results apply when each player 2 observes all realizations of public randomization devices, or a subset of them.
10In Section 4, I generalize my result to settings in which each player 2 observes a bounded stochastic subset of player
1’s past actions. In Section 5, I examine the game’s outcomes when each player 2 can also observe an informative signal
about player 1’s action in the current period.
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Payoffs: For every strategy profile (σ1, σ2), strategic-type player 1’s discounted average payoff is
E
(σ1,σ2)
1
[∑∞
t=0(1 − δ)δ
tu1(at, bt)
]
, where E
(σ1,σ2)
1 [·] is the expectation over histories when player 2s
play according to σ2 and player 1 plays according to σ1. Player 2s’ welfare is E
(σ1,σ2,pi0)
[∑∞
t=0(1 −
δs)δ
t
su2(at, bt)
]
where E(σ1,σ2,pi0)[·] is the expectation over histories when player 2s play according to
σ2, player 1 plays according to σ1 with probability 1−π0, and plays a
∗
1 in every period with probability
π0, and δs ∈ (0, 1) is a discount factor that a planner uses to evaluate different generations of player
2s’ welfare. Potentially, δ and δs can be different.
Solution Concept: I use sequential equilibrium defined in Pe¸ski (2014) for results on reputation
failures, i.e., the existence of equilibria in which a patient player 1 receives a low payoff. This ensures
that the equilibria I construct are not driven by uninformed players’ unreasonable off-path beliefs. I use
Bayes Nash Equilibrium for results that establish the common properties of all equilibria. This ensures
the robustness of my findings against equilibrium selection. For a given parameter configuration
(δ, π0,K), let NE(δ, π0,K) ⊂ Σ1×Σ2 be the set of Bayes Nash Equilibria, and let SE(δ, π0,K) ⊂ Σ1×Σ2
be the set of strategy profiles that are part of some sequential equilibria.
3.1 Reputation Failure under Social Learning
I show that reputation building can result in low payoffs for both players, which contrasts to the
conclusions of canonical reputation models. Let (a′, b′) ∈ A × B be the worst pure-strategy Nash
equilibrium for player 1 in the stage-game. Let v1 ≡ u1(a
′, b′), which by definition, is weakly lower
than u1(a
∗, b∗). Let
δ ≡

 max
{
maxa∈A u1(a,b
∗)−u1(a∗,b∗)
maxa∈A u1(a,b∗)−v1
,
v
1
−u1(a∗,b′)
u1(a∗,b∗)−u1(a∗,b′)
}
if v1 < u1(a
∗, b∗)
0 if v1 = u1(a
∗, b∗).
Theorem 1. When stage-game payoffs satisfy Assumptions 1 and 2. For every K ∈ N, there
exists π0 ∈ (0, 1), such that for every π0 ∈ (0, π0) and δ ≥ δ, there exists (σ
δ
1, σ
δ
2) ∈ SE(δ, π0,K), such
that:
E
(σδ
1
,σδ
2
)
1
[ ∞∑
t=0
(1− δ)δtu1(at, bt)
]
= v1. (3.1)
According to Theorem 1, when the prior probability of commitment type is below some cutoff,
there exist equilibria in which the long-run player receives his lowest stage-game Nash Equilibrium
payoff regardless of his discount factor δ and the short-run players’ capacity to process information
K. It demonstrates the failure of reputation effects when player 1’s pure Stackelberg payoff is strictly
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greater than u1(a
′, b′), i.e., player 1 can strictly benefit from commitment in the stage game:
Condition 1 (Strict Benefit from Commitment). u1(a
∗, b∗) > v1.
11
Under the strict benefit from commitment condition, Theorem 1 contrasts to the conclusions in
Fudenberg and Levine (1989, 1992) and Gossner (2011): if player 2s have unbounded observations of
player 1’s past actions (i.e., K =∞), or more generally, unbounded observations of noisy signals that
can statistically identify player 1’s actions, then a patient player 1 can guarantee his Stackelberg payoff
u1(a
∗, b∗) in all Bayes Nash Equilibria of the reputation game.
Intuitively, reputation fails since consumers’ learning is slow.12 In particular, although player 2s’
actions are informative about player 1’s actions in the past, their informativeness vanishes endoge-
nously as player 1 becomes patient. This is reflected in my constructive proof of Theorem 1 (Section
3.3): Player 2s’ actions converge to b∗ with probability 1 on the equilibrium path, but the rate with
which their actions converge vanishes to 0 as δ goes to 1. The low speed of social learning wipes out
player 1’s returns from reputation building, discourages him from building a reputation, and makes
player 2s’ pessimistic beliefs about player 1’s actions in the early stages of the game self-fulfilling.
Two natural questions follow from Theorem 1. First, even when v1 is strictly lower than u1(a
∗, b∗),
it may not equal to player 1’s minmax payoff. Second, Theorem 1 demonstrates the negative payoff
consequences from the long-run player’s perspective, but a more important question in many applica-
tions is the short-run players’ welfare. I state two results that address these concerns:
1. I identify a class of games that fit into buyer-seller applications (i.e., games with monotone-
supermodular payoffs defined in Condition 2), in which v1 coincides with player 1’s minmax
payoff. In Appendix A.3, I focus on games in which player 1’s minmax payoff is strictly lower
than v1 and provide sufficient conditions under which player 1’s lowest equilibrium payoff in the
reputation game equals his minmax payoff.
2. I show that slow observational learning also results in low welfare for player 2s, regardless of the
discount factor a social planner uses to evaluate different generations of player 2s’ payoffs. In
games with monotone-supermodular payoffs, there exist equilibria in which both players attain
their respective minmax payoffs.
11Condition 1 is less demanding than the lack-of-commitment condition in Cripps, Mailath, and Sameulson (2004,
Assumption 3), which requires that the Stackelberg action a∗ does not best reply against b∗. My strict benefit from
commitment condition is satisfied not only in product choice games and entry deterrence games, but is also satisfied
in games with conflicting interests such as chicken games, and coordination games in which player 1 receives different
payoffs from different pure strategy Nash equilibria.
12In order to confirm that slow learning is the driving force behind Theorem 1, I establish common properties of all
Bayes Nash Equilibria in Section 3.2, which rule out other potential causes of reputation failures. The forces that are
ruled out include player 2s’ herding, player 2s’ actions being uninformative, and player 1 receiving low asymptotic payoff.
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Attaining Long-Run Player’s Minmax Payoff: I review the notion of player 1’s minmax payoff
in Fudenberg, Kreps and Maskin (1990) which takes player 2s’ myopia into account. Let
B∗ ≡ {β ∈ ∆(B)|∃α ∈ ∆(A) s.t. β ∈ BR2(α)} ⊂ ∆(B) (3.2)
be the set of player 2’s mixed actions that best reply against some mixed actions of player 1’s. Since
player 2s are myopic, their actions belong to B∗ at every on-path history. Player 1’s minmax payoff is:
vmin1 ≡ min
β∈B∗
max
a∈A
u1(a, β), (3.3)
which is his lowest payoff in any Bayes Nash Equilibrium of the reputation game. Action β ∈ B∗ is
player 2’s minmax action if and only if player 1’s payoff from best replying against β equals vmin1 .
I show that v1 = v
min
1 in monotone-supermodular games, which have been a primary focus of the
reputation literature and are applicable to the study of business transactions (Mailath and Samuelson
2001, Liu 2011, Liu and Skrzypacz 2014), capital taxation (Phelan 2006), monetary policy (Barro and
Gordon 1983), and so on:13
Condition 2. Payoffs are monotone-supermodular if there exist complete orders on A and B:
1. u1(a, b) is strictly decreasing in a and is strictly increasing in b.
2. u1(a, b) has non-increasing differences, and u2(a, b) has strictly increasing differences in (a, b).
3. a∗ is not the lowest element in A.
For example, the product choice game in Section 2 satisfies monotone-supermodularity when player
1’s actions are ranked according to H ≻ L, and player 2’s actions are ranked according to T ≻ N .
I provide economic interpretations of this condition in context of the buyer-seller application. Let
player 1 be a seller with a ∈ A interpreted as his effort or the quality of his product. Let each player
2 be a buyer with b ∈ B interpreted as the quantity she buys. Monotone-supermodularity requires
that (1) it is costly for the seller to exert high effort or to supply high quality, but he strictly benefits
from buyers’ purchases; (2) buyers have stronger incentives to purchase larger quantities when the
seller’s effort is higher or the quality of product is higher; (3) the seller receives more benefit from
undercutting quality when a buyer purchases a larger quantity;14 (4) exerting the lowest effort is not
13The monotone-supermodular condition is different from the one in Pei (2020) which incorporates interdependent
values. Moreover, Pei (2020) does not require u1(a, b) to have non-increasing differences. My condition is similar to the
one in Liu and Skrzypacz (2014), which requires u1(a, b) to have strictly decreasing differences.
14u1(a, b) having strictly decreasing differences in (a, b) is not required for the results in this section (i.e., Theorem 2,
Corollaries 1 and 2), but is needed for the results on stochastic sampling in Section 4.
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the seller’s optimal commitment action.
Under the first and second requirements in Condition 2, player 1’s minmax payoff coincides with
his lowest pure strategy Nash equilibrium payoff in the stage game. Under the third requirement, his
minmax payoff is strictly lower than his pure Stackelberg payoff.
Corollary 1. If players’ payoffs are monotone-supermodular, then v1 = v
min
1 < u1(a
∗, b∗).
Short-Run Players’ Welfare: My next result demonstrates the failure of reputation effects from
player 2s’ perspective. Let (a′′, b′′) ∈ A×B be a worst pure-strategy stage-game Nash equilibrium for
player 2. Recall that δs is a planner’s discount factor when evaluating player 2s’ welfare. Let
δ′ ≡

 max
{
maxa∈A u1(a,b
∗)−u1(a∗,b∗)
maxa∈A u1(a,b∗)−u1(a′′,b′′)
, u1(a
′′,b′′)−u1(a∗,b′′)
u1(a∗,b∗)−u1(a∗,b′′)
}
if u1(a
′′, b′′) < u1(a
∗, b∗)
0 if u1(a
′′, b′′) = u1(a
∗, b∗)
I show that player 2s’ welfare can be low regardless of the planner’s discount factor:
Theorem 2. Under Assumptions 1 and 2. For every K ∈ N, δs ∈ (0, 1), and ε > 0, there exists
π0 ∈ (0, 1) such that for every π0 ∈ (0, π0) and δ ≥ δ
′, there exists (σδ1, σ
δ
2) ∈ SE(δ, π0,K), such that:
E
(σδ
1
,σδ
2
,pi0)
[ ∞∑
t=0
(1− δs)δ
t
su2(at, bt)
]
≤ u2(a
′′, b′′) + ε. (3.4)
The proof is in Appendix A.1. Theorems 1 and 2 together have powerful implications on games
with monotone-supermodular payoffs (Condition 2). Let a ≡ minA and {b} ≡ BR2(a). The third
requirement in Condition 2 implies that a∗ ≻ a, and (a, b) is a stage-game Nash equilibrium. This
implies that games with monotone-supermodular payoffs automatically satisfy Assumption 2.
Theorems 1 and 2 imply the following corollary, that slow observational learning leads to sequential
equilibria in which both players receive low payoffs. Under an additional requirement that a minimizes
u2(a, b) for every b ∈ B (i.e., the seller’s lowest effort minimizes the buyer’s payoff), both players’
equilibrium payoffs are arbitrarily close to their respective minmax payoffs:
Corollary 2. If players’ payoffs are monotone-supermodular and satisfy Assumption 1, then there
exists δ ∈ (0, 1). For every K ∈ N, δs ∈ (0, 1), and ε > 0, there exists π0 ∈ (0, 1) such that for every
π0 ∈ (0, π0) and δ ≥ δ, there exists (σ
δ
1, σ
δ
2) ∈ SE(δ, π0,K) such that:
1. player 1’s discounted average payoff equals u1(a, b),
2. player 2’s discounted average welfare is at most u2(a, b) + ε.
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3.2 Common Properties of All Equilibria
To appreciate the subtlety of Theorem 1 and to distinguish its underlying mechanism from existing
results on social learning and reputation failures, I establish three properties that apply to all Bayes
Nash equilibria. I present these findings in decreasing level of generality.
First, I show that player 2s never herd on actions other than b∗. It clarifies the conceptual difference
between my result and the ones in Banerjee (1992), Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1992),
and Smith and Sørensen (2000), in which inefficiencies are caused by myopic players herding on an
inefficient action. For every σ2 ∈ Σ2, h
t ∈ Ht, and b ∈ B, I say that player 2s herd on action b at ht if
σ2(h
s) = b for every on-path history hs  ht.
Proposition 1. Under Assumptions 1 and 2. For every Bayes Nash equilibrium (σ1, σ2), every
on-path history ht, and every b 6= b∗. If π(ht) > 0, then player 2s cannot herd on b at ht.
Proof of Proposition 1: When future player 2s herd on action b 6= b∗ at ht, strategic-type player 1
has no intertemporal incentive at all histories succeeding ht. Therefore, strategic-type player 1 plays
his myopic best reply against b at every subsequent history in equilibrium. I consider two cases
separately, depending on whether a∗ best replies against the herding action b or not. First, suppose
BR1(b) = {a
∗}, then both types of player 1 play a∗ in equilibrium with probability 1. As a result,
player 2 has a strict incentive to play b∗ instead of b at ht. This contradicts the presumption that
b 6= b∗. Next, suppose BR1(b) 6= {a
∗}. In equilibrium, strategic-type player 1 plays a∗ with probability
0 at ht. Since π(ht) > 0, player 2’s posterior belief attaches probability 1 to the commitment type
after observing a∗ at ht, and has a strict incentive to play b∗ in period t+ 1 given that K ≥ 1. This
contradicts the presumption that player 2s herd on action b 6= b∗.
Next, I focus on games in which player 1 faces a strict lack-of-commitment problem, i.e., his pure
Stackelberg action does not best reply against any action in B∗. This includes, but not limited to games
with monotone-supermodular payoffs. It suggests that player 2s’ actions are informative signals about
player 1’s actions whenever the latter receives a low payoff in the near future. It distinguishes my
result from the ones on bad reputations such as Ely and Va¨lima¨ki (2003) and Ely, Fudenberg and
Levine (2008), in which the short-run players can take an action (i.e., refuse to participate) that stops
future short-run players from learning while giving the long-run player his minmax payoff.
Proposition 2. If a∗ does not best reply against any action in B∗, then for every Bayes Nash
Equilibrium and at every on-path history ht with π(ht) > 0,
• either (bt+1, ..., bt+K ) is informative about player 1’s action at h
t,
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• or σ2(h
t+τ ) = b∗ for every 1 ≤ τ ≤ K and ht+τ ≻ ht with a∗ being played from t to t+ τ − 1.15
Proposition 2 implies that in games where player 1 has a strict incentive to deviate from his pure
Stackelberg action in the stage game, as long as the strategic type imitates the commitment type, either
player 1 is guaranteed to receive his Stackelberg payoff u1(a
∗, b∗) in the next K periods, or player 2s’
actions in the next K periods are informative signals about player 1’s action in the current period.
The long-run player receives a high payoff in the first case, and information about his current-period
behavior is communicated to all future player 2s in the second case. This is reminiscent of the logic
behind Fudenberg and Levine (1989, 1992)’s reputation results, that by imitating the commitment
type, the strategic long-run player either receives a high stage-game payoff, or can generate a public
signal that is informative about his type.
Proof of Proposition 2: Let (σ1, σ2) be a Bayes Nash equilibrium, and let h
t be an on-path history with
π(ht) > 0. Suppose (bt+1, ..., bt+K ) is uninformative about player 1’s action at h
t, then strategic-type
player 1 plays his myopic best reply against player 2’s action at ht.
Since player 2s play some action in B∗ at every on-path history, and a∗ does not best reply against
any action in B∗, strategic-type player 1 has a strict incentive not to play a∗ at ht. Given that
π(ht) > 0, player 2’s posterior belief attaches probability 1 to type ωc after observing a∗ at ht. For
every τ ∈ {1, 2, ...,K}, player 2 plays b∗ in period t+τ when she observes a∗ in the past K periods.
In games with monotone-supermodular payoffs, Proposition 2 implies a tight lower bound on player
1’s asymptotic payoff when he plays a∗ in every period, which is stated as Proposition 3. Let E(a
∗,σ2)
be the expectation when player 1 plays a∗ in every period and player 2s use strategy σ2.
Proposition 3. If stage-game payoffs are monotone-supermodular, then for every BNE (σ1, σ2),
lim inf
t→∞
1
t
E
(a∗,σ2)
[ t−1∑
s=0
u1(as, bs)
]
≥
K
K + 1
u1(a
∗, b∗) +
1
K + 1
min
b∈B
u1(a
∗, b). (3.5)
Moreover, there exists a sequential equilibrium with strategy profile (σ1, σ2) such that:
lim
t→∞
1
t
E
(a∗,σ2)
[ t−1∑
s=0
u1(as, bs)
]
=
K
K + 1
u1(a
∗, b∗) +
1
K + 1
min
b∈B
u1(a
∗, b).16 (3.6)
15Compared to Proposition 1, Proposition 2 rules out a larger class of strategies, which includes but not limited to
player 2s herding on a pure action. For example, Proposition 2 rules out situations in which player 2s play mixed actions,
or their strategies depend nontrivially on calendar time or previous player 2s’ actions, but not on their observations of
player 1’s past actions. As a consequence, Proposition 2 also imposes an additional requirement on players’ stage-game
payoffs, namely, the Stackelberg action is strictly suboptimal for player 1 in the stage game.
16Proposition 3 does not contradict the disappearing reputation result in Cripps, Mailath and Samuelson (2004) that
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The proof is in Appendix A.2. Inequality (3.5) implies that by imitating the commitment type,
player 1’s asymptotic payoff is at least a fraction K
K+1 of his Stackelberg payoff, with the RHS of (3.5)
converging to u1(a
∗, b∗) as K goes to infinity. This lower bound is tight in the sense that there exists an
equilibrium that attains this asymptotic payoff. Proposition 3 contrasts to Theorem 1 which suggests
that no matter how large K is, player 1’s discounted average payoff equals his lowest stage-game Nash
Equilibrium payoff. This comparison not only highlights the importance of player 1’s discount factor
in models where the speed of learning is endogenous, but also shows that Theorem 1 is driven by the
low speed of social learning, rather than low-payoff outcomes in the long run.
3.3 Proof of Theorem 1
Recall the definitions of (a′, b′) and (a∗, b∗). If b′ = b∗, then according to Assumption 1, a′ = a∗ and
payoff v1 is attained in an equilibrium where (a
∗, b∗) is played at every history.
In what follows, I consider the interesting case in which b′ 6= b∗. Assumption 1 implies that:
u1(a
∗, b∗) >︸︷︷︸
a∗ is pure Stackelberg action
u1(a
′, b′) >︸︷︷︸
(a′, b′) is a Nash Equilibrium
u1(a
∗, b′). (3.7)
Let q∗ ∈ (0, 1) be small enough such that b′ is player 2’s best reply against player 1’s mixed action
q∗ ◦ a∗ + (1− q∗) ◦ a′. Let π0 ∈ (0, 1) be defined via:
π0
1− π0
=
( q∗
2− q∗
)K+1
,
which is the upper bound on the prior probability of commitment type. For every π0 ∈ (0, π0) and δ
large enough, I construct the following three-phase equilibrium in which strategic-type player 1 attains
payoff v1. The current phase of play depends only on the history of player 2s’ actions, which are
commonly observed by both players. In period t,
1. play is in the reputation building phase if there exists no s < t such that bs = b
∗;
2. play is in the reputation maintenance phase if (1) there exists s < t such that bs = b
∗, and (2)
there exists no τ ∈ {s∗ + 1, ..., t − 1} such that bτ 6= b
∗, where s∗ is the smallest s with bs = b
∗;
the long-run player’s asymptotic payoff equals to one of his payoffs in the repeated complete information game without
commitment type. Notice that the LHS of (3.5) is player 1’s asymptotic payoff when he plays a∗ in every period, while
Cripps, Mailath and Samuelson (2004)’s result examines player 1’s asymptotic payoff under his equilibrium strategy. In
Cripps, Mailath and Samuelson (2004), the short-run players have unbounded observations of informative signals about
the long-run player’s past actions. One can use the arguments in Fudenberg and Levine (1992) and Gossner (2011) to
show that the long-run player’s asymptotic payoff by playing a∗ in every period is at least his pure Stackelberg payoff.
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3. play is in the punishment phase if (1) there exists s < t such that bs = b
∗, and (2) there exists
τ ∈ {s∗ + 1, ..., t − 1} such that bτ 6= b
∗, where s∗ is the smallest s such that bs = b
∗.
Play starts from the reputation building phase, and gradually reaches the reputation maintenance
phase. Play reaches the punishment phase only at off-path histories.17
Equilibrium Strategies: Let r ∈ (0, 1) be defined via the following equation:
(1− δ)u1(a
∗, b′) + δru1(a
∗, b∗) + δ(1 − r)u1(a
′, b′) = u1(a
′, b′). (3.8)
One can verify that when δ is large enough, r is strictly between 0 and 1, and converges to 0 as δ goes
to 1. At every history ht of the reputation-building phase,
• If (1) t = 0, or (2) t ≥ 1 and at−1 6= a
∗, or (3) t ≥ 1, at−1 = a
∗ and ξt > r, then player 2 plays b
′
and strategic-type player 1 plays a∗ with probability q∗/2 and plays a′ with probability 1− q∗/2.
• If t ≥ 1, at−1 = a
∗ and ξt ≤ r, then player 2 plays b
∗ and player 1 plays a∗.
At every history of the reputation maintenance phase,
• If at−1 = a
∗, then player 1 plays a∗ and player 2 plays b∗.
• If at−1 6= a
∗, then player 2 plays b′ and strategic-type player 1 plays a′.
At every history of the punishment phase, player 1 plays a′ and player 2 plays b′.
Incentive Constraints: I verify players’ incentives constraints. To start with, when δ > δ,
u1(a
∗, b∗) ≥ (1− δ)max
a∈A
u1(a, b
∗) + δu1(a
′, b′).
This implies that player 1 has an incentive to play a∗ in the reputation-maintenance phase. Next, given
that player 1’s continuation value is u1(a
∗, b∗) in the reputation-maintenance phase and is u1(a
′, b′)
in the reputation building phase, (3.8) implies that player 1 is indifferent between a′ and a∗ in the
reputation-building phase. Since a′ best replies against b′ in the stage game, player 1 strictly prefers
a′ to actions other than a∗ and a′.
17The punishment phase only occurs off the equilibrium path when the seller knows each buyer’s sample and players
have access to a public randomization device. It occurs on the equilibrium path either when each buyer’s sample is
stochastic and is not observed by the seller (Section 4), or players do not have access to a public randomization device.
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Next, I verify player 2’s incentive to play b′ in the reputation-building phase by showing that player
1’s reputation is at most q∗/2. If player 1 has played actions other than a∗ in at least one of the last
K periods, then player 2’s belief attaches probability 0 to the commitment type. Suppose b∗ has never
been played before (i.e., play remains in the reputation-building phase) and a∗ was played in the last
K periods, πt satisfies the following equation:
πt
1− πt
/ π0
1− π0
=
Pr(a
∗,σδ
2
)(a∗, ..., a∗)
Pr(σ
δ
1
,σδ
2
)(a∗, ..., a∗)
·
Pr(a
∗
1
,σδ
2
)(b′, ..., b′, ξt|a
∗, ..., a∗)
Pr(σ
δ
1
,σδ
2
)(b′, ..., b′, ξt|a∗, ..., a∗)
, (3.9)
where Pr(σ
δ
1
,σδ
2
)(·) is the probability measure induced by strategy profile (σδ1, σ
δ
2), and Pr
(a∗,σδ
2
)(·) is the
probability measure when player 1 plays a∗ in every period and player 2s’ strategy is σδ2.
Since the strategic type plays a∗ with probability q∗/2 in every period of the reputation building
phase, we have:
Pr(σ
δ
1
,σδ
2
)(a∗, ..., a∗|ωc)
Pr(σ
δ
1
,σδ
2
)(a∗, ..., a∗|ωs)
≤
( q∗
2− q∗
)−K
. (3.10)
In addition, b′ occurs with weakly lower probability when player 1 is the commitment type, which
implies that:
Pr(σ
δ
1
,σδ
2
)(b′, ..., b′, ξt|a
∗, ..., a∗, ωc)
Pr(σ
δ
1
,σδ
2
)(b′, ..., b′, ξt|a∗, ..., a∗, ωs)
≤ 1. (3.11)
Since pi01−pi0 ≤
pi0
1−pi0
=
(
q∗
2−q∗
)K+1
, (3.9), (3.10) and (3.11) together imply that πt ≤
q∗
2 . As a result, the
unconditional probability with which player 2 believes that player 1 plays a∗ is at most q
∗
2 +(1−
q∗
2 )
q∗
2 <
q∗ at every history of the reputation-building phase. This verifies player 2’s incentive to play b′ in the
reputation-building phase.
3.4 Connections to Existing Reputation Models
I reconcile Theorem 1 and the results in Fudenberg and Levine (1989, 1992) by applying Gossner
(2011)’s arguments to my model. I explain why it leads to an uninformative payoff lower bound
despite player 2s’ actions are informative about player 1’s past actions. I also explain the conceptual
differences between the low-payoff equilibria in my model with the ones in reputation models with two
equally patient players, such as Cripps and Thomas (1997) and Chan (2000).
Relative Entropy & Value of Reputations: Recall that Gossner (2011) establishes the following
upper bound on the expected sum of Kullback-Leibler divergence (hereafter, KL divergence) between
the distribution over public signals generated by the commitment type and the distribution over public
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signals generated by players’ equilibrium strategies:
E
(a∗,σ2)
[ ∞∑
t=0
d
(
yt(·|a
∗)
∣∣∣∣∣∣yt(·))] ≤ − log π0, (3.12)
where π0 is the prior probability of the commitment type, yt(·) is the distribution over period t public
signals according to players’ equilibrium strategies, yt(·|a
∗) is the distribution over period t public
signals when player 2s play their equilibrium strategy and player 1 plays a∗ in every period, and d(·‖·)
is the relative entropy between the two probability distributions. I call d
(
yt(·|a
∗)
∣∣∣∣yt(·)) player 2’s
one-step ahead prediction error in period t.
Inequality (3.12) applies to my setting once we take yt to be the distribution of (bt+1, ..., bt+K).
According to Proposition 2, (bt+1, ..., bt+K) is an informative signal of at unless player 1’s average
payoff in the next K periods is at least u1(a
∗, b∗).
The difference arises when deriving the lower bound on player 1’s discounted average payoff from
inequality (3.12). In the models of Fudenberg and Levine (1989, 1992) and Gossner (2011), if the public
signals can statistically identify player 1’s actions and when player 2 does not have a strict incentive to
play b∗, then d
(
yt(·|a
∗)
∥∥yt(·)) is bounded from below by a strictly positive number. Therefore, as long
as player 1 imitates the commitment type, the expected number of periods in which player 2s’ myopic
best reply is not b∗ is bounded from above. As player 1 becomes patient, the payoff consequence of
this bounded number of periods goes to 0. As a result, a patient player 1 is guaranteed to receive his
optimal commitment payoff.
In my model, the value of d
(
yt(·|a
∗)
∥∥yt(·)) is strictly positive whenever player 2 does not have a
strict incentive to play b∗, and player 1’s average payoff from period t to t+K is less than
K
K + 1
u1(a
∗, b∗) +
1
K + 1
min
b∈B
u1(a
∗, b).
However, the lower bound on d
(
yt(·|a
∗)
∥∥yt(·)) depends on δ, and vanishes to 0 as δ → 1. Intuitively,
future player 2s’ actions are responsive to player 1’s past actions in order to provide player 1 an
incentive to play actions other than his myopic best reply (for example, player 1’s Stackelberg action).
When player 1 becomes more patient, he puts more weight on his continuation value relative to his
stage-game payoff. Therefore, he is willing to sacrifice his stage-game payoff even when his action
affects player 2s’ future actions with low probability. This endogenously reduces the informativeness
of player 2s’ actions, lowers the speed of learning, increases the amount of time required for player 1
to establish a reputation, which in turn, wipes out player 1’s returns from building reputations.
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In the constructed equilibrium in Section 3.2, player 2’s one-step ahead prediction error in the
reputation building phase is:
log
(
1 + (1− q∗)(1− δ)
)
. (3.13)
Using the Taylor’s expansion, (3.13) is of magnitude 1−δ when δ is close to 1. As a result, when player
1 imitates the commitment type, the expected number of periods with which player 2’s belief about
player 1’s action being far away from a∗ goes to infinity as δ → 1. As predicted by Theorem 1, the
negative payoff consequence of such periods completely offsets the benefits from building reputations.
Reputation Models with Two Equally Patient Players: Cripps and Thomas (1997) study
reputation games between an informed player and an equally patient uninformed player. They focus
on common interest games, and assume that both players can perfectly observe each other’s actions
in the past. When the prior probability of the commitment type is sufficiently low, they construct
a sequential equilibrium in which both players’ payoffs are arbitrarily close to their minmax payoffs,
regardless of their common discount factor. In the following example, suppose with small but positive
probability, player 1 is a commitment type that plays H in every period,
– A B
H 1, 1 −ε,−ε
L −ε,−ε 0, 0
there exist equilibria in which both players’ discounted average payoffs are arbitrarily close to 0.
In the active learning phase of their constructed equilibrium, player 1 plays H with probability
close to 1, i.e., learning is slow. However, player 2 does not play her myopic best reply against H. The
reason is: player 2 fears that once she plays A while player 1 plays L, players will coordinate on the
inefficient outcome (L,B) in all future periods. Similar to the equilibrium constructed in the proof
of Theorem 1, the asymptotic play also converges to the Stackelberg outcome although the patient
player’s discounted average payoff is low, regardless of the common discount factor shared by the two
players. This finding is generalized by Chan (2000) to all games except for (1) games where player 1
has a strictly dominant action (such as the prisoner’s dilemma), and (2) games with strictly conflicting
interests (such as the chain store game).
Compared to the reputation failure results of Cripps and Thomas (1997) and Chan (2000) that
hinge on the uninformed player’s patience, I show that learning can be arbitrarily slow and reputation
effects can fail even when the uninformed players are myopic. In terms of how players’ patience affects
the informed player’s guaranteed payoff from building reputations, in models with unbounded records,
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such as Fudenberg and Levine (1989, 1992), Cripps and Thomas (1997) and Chan (2000), the informed
player’s patience helps reputation building, while the uninformed player’s patience hurts reputation
building.18 This contrasts to my model in which the informed player’s patience is self-defeating since
it endogenously lowers the speed of social learning. This causes reputations to fail even when the
uninformed players are myopic.
My reputation failure result also applies to games in which Chan (2000)’s folk theorem result fails.
This includes games with strictly conflicting interests, such as the following entry deterrence game:
– Out In
F 2, 0 0,−1
A 2, 0 1, 1
When there exists a commitment type that plays F in every period, Cripps, Dekel and Pesendorfer
(2005) show that player 1 can secure his Stackelberg payoff 2 in a model with equally patient players.
In contrast, my Theorem 1 suggests that when player 2s are myopic, have unlimited observations
of other player 2s’ actions, but have bounded observations about player 1’s past actions, there exist
equilibria in which player 1’s payoff equals his minmax payoff 1.19
4 Reputation Failure under Stochastic Sampling
In many applications of interest, consumers are connected via a social network. Each consumer com-
municates with her neighbors, learns about the seller’s actions against them before making a decision;
or consumers stochastically sample their predecessors to learn about their personal experiences.
In contrast to the baseline model, a common feature in these scenarios is that the seller cannot
observe who do each buyer samples and the realized social network among buyers. As a result, buyers
are privately learning about the seller’s type and are privately monitoring the seller’s past actions.
Motivated by these practical concerns, this section studies games with monotone-supermodular
stage-game payoffs (Condition 2) and generalizes the insights of Theorem 1 when each buyer samples
a bounded stochastic subset of her predecessors and observes the seller’s actions against them.20
18Compared to reputation games with equal discounting, one can obtain positive reputation results in a larger class of
games when the uninformed player is forward-looking, but is infinitely less patient relative to the informed player. See
Schmidt (1993) and Evans and Thomas (1997) for positive reputation results.
19The example in Cripps, Dekel and Pesendorfer (2005) violates Assumption 1 since both F and A are player 1’s
stage-game best replies against player 2’s action Out. Nevertheless, one can use the same argument in the proof of
Theorem 1 to find equilibria in which player 1’s discounted average payoff is 1. The details are available upon request.
20In Online Appendix A, I further generalize my result by relaxing the monotone-supermodularity assumption on
payoffs. I identify the assumptions that are needed on players’ payoffs. The general version of my results apply not
only to monotone-supermodular games (e.g., product choice game, capital taxation game, and trust game), but also to
common interest games, battle of sexes, chicken games, and so on.
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Let {Nt}
∞
t=1 be a stochastic network among buyers, with Nt ∈ ∆
(
2{0,1,...,t−1}
)
. The realization of
Nt is Nt ⊂ {0, 1, ..., t − 1}, which is privately observed by the period t buyer and is unbeknownst to
the seller. Period t buyer’s private history consists of Nt, buyers’ actions from period 0 to t− 1, and
the seller’s actions against buyers in subset Nt, i.e.,
ht2 ≡
{
Nt, b0, b1, ..., bt−1,
(
as
)
s∈Nt
, ξt
}
. (4.1)
Player 1’s private history remains the same as in the baseline model, i.e., ht1 ≡ {a0, ..., at−1, b0, ..., bt−1, ξ0, ..., ξt}.
I introduce the following regularity condition on the stochastic network among buyers:
Assumption 3. For every s 6= t, Ns and Nt are independent random variables. There exist K ∈ N
and γ ∈ (0, 1) such that Pr
(
|Nt| ≤ K
)
= 1 and Pr
(
t− 1 ∈ Nt
)
≥ γ for every t ≥ 1.
The first part of Assumption 3 requires different buyers’ neighborhoods to be independent. My
result extends when each buyer’s sampling process depends on previous buyers’ actions, i.e., Nt depends
on {b0, ..., bt−1}, as long as for every s < t, Ns and Nt are independent conditional on {b0, ..., bs−1}.
This independence assumption is standard in the observational learning literature, which is trivially
satisfied when the network is deterministic (Banerjee 1992), and is also assumed in models with random
sampling such as Banerjee and Fudenberg (2004) and Acemoglu, Dahleh, Lobel and Ozdaglar (2011).21
It implies that each buyer can learn about the seller’s type only through the seller’s actions against
her neighbors {as}s∈Nt and the previous buyers’ actions {bs}s≤t−1, i.e., she cannot obtain additional
information from the realization of Nt.
The second part Pr
(
|Nt| ≤ K
)
= 1 requires the existence of a uniform upper bound on the number
of predecessors each buyer can sample. As in the baseline model, K is interpreted as a constraint on
the buyers’ ability to process detailed information. The third part Pr
(
t − 1 ∈ Nt
)
≥ γ requires a
uniform lower bound on the probability with which each buyer observes the seller’s action against her
immediate predecessor. Without this requirement, the seller’s action in each period will be observed by
future buyers with vanishingly low probability, and buyers’ actions will not be adequate to motivate the
seller to exert high effort. This requirement is satisfied for sampling processes that exhibit recency bias.
It rules out uniform sampling (i.e., the agent samples K out of t predecessors, and each predecessor is
sampled with equal probability) since the probability with which the immediate predecessor’s action
being observed vanishes to zero as the sample size grows to infinity.
Let SE(δ, π0,N ) be the set of sequential equilibria in a repeated game with social network N ≡
21A notable exception is Lobel and Sadler (2015), in which they present examples where social learning fails when
agents’ neighborhoods are correlated.
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{Nt}t∈N, discount factor δ, and prior belief π0. Theorem 3 generalizes the finding of Theorem 1 to
reputation games with stochastic network monitoring:
Theorem 3. If stage-game payoffs are monotone-supermodular and satisfy Assumption 1, and the
stochastic network N satisfies Assumption 3, then there exist π0 ∈ (0, 1) and δ ∈ (0, 1), such that for
every π0 ∈ (0, π0) and δ > δ, there exists (σ
δ
1, σ
δ
2) ∈ SE(δ, π0,N ), such that:
E
(σδ
1
,σδ
2
)
1
[ ∞∑
t=0
(1− δ)δtu1(at, bt)
]
= v1. (4.2)
A constructive proof is in Appendix B. Several features in the construction of Section 3.3 extends.
First, play starts from a phase with active learning in which player 1 receives a low payoff, and
gradually enters a phase in which learning stops and player 1 receives a high payoff. Second, the
transition probability between the two phases depends endogenously on player 1’s discount factor,
which vanishes to zero as δ → 1. Third, the asymptotic play converges to player 1’s Stackelberg
outcome (a∗, b∗) with probability close to 1. However, the speed with which play converges to this
high-payoff phase is low. This wipes out player 1’s gains from reputation building and provides him
an incentive to play the stage-game Nash Equilibrium action rather than his Stackelberg action.
The technical challenge stems from private monitoring and private learning, both of which arise
when the seller does not observe the realized network. The belief-free approach to construct equilibria
in Ely, Ho¨rner and Olszewski (2005), Ho¨rner and Lovo (2009), and Ho¨rner, Lovo and Tomala (2011)
does not apply in my model, since buyers are myopic and do not have intertemporal incentives. In
equilibria where active learning takes place, buyers’ actions are sensitive to their posterior beliefs about
the seller’s type, making it hard to sustain belief-free incentives.
To illustrate the idea, consider the product choice game in Section 2. Let q∗ be the minimal
probability with which H needs to be played in order to provide player 2 an incentive to play T . Let
{a0, ..., at−1, b0, ..., bt−1} be a complete history in period t, consisting of all actions taken in the past.
First, consider providing belief-free incentives such that (1) conditional on each complete history,
player 2 believes that H will be played with probability q∗, and (2) each player 2 mixes between T and
N with probability that makes player 1 indifferent between H and L. Under this arrangement, both
T and N are player 2’s best replies, regardless of her belief about player 1’s type and private history.
However, this belief-free construction is feasible in period t only if after observing each period
t complete history, player 2’s posterior belief attaches probability less than q∗ to the commitment
type. Since player 2s play N in the active learning phase, the probability with which player 1 plays
H is bounded away from 1. Therefore, a hypothetical observer’s posterior belief attaches probability
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arbitrarily close to 1 to the commitment type after observing a long string of H. This implies the
existence of a cutoff calendar time, such that the above belief-free arrangement is feasible only if
calendar time is below this cutoff.
In light of this observation, I use the following belief-based construction when calendar time is
above the aforementioned cutoff. In particular, player 1’s action depends on his private history, which
is chosen such that each player 2 is indifferent under her posterior belief about player 1’s private
history. This is equivalent to establish the existence of solution to a system of linear equations, in
which the number of player 1’s private histories is the number of free variables, and the number
of player 2’s private histories is the number of linear constraints. In period t, the number of free
variables is 2t. Given that the sample size is bounded above by K, the number of constraints is at
most 2K
∑K
j=0
(
t
j
)
. An important observation is that the linear system is under-determined if and only
if t is large relative to K. This explains why the belief-free construction is used when calendar time
is low, and the belief-based construction is used when calendar time is large.
5 Private Signals about Current Period Action
This section studies a variant of the baseline model in which every uninformed player observes an
informative private signal about the informed player’s current-period action, in addition to the entire
history of her predecessors’ actions, and possibly, the informed player’s actions in the last K periods
(or the informed player’s actions against her neighbors in some stochastic network). I provide nec-
essary and sufficient conditions under which the patient player can secure his Stackelberg payoff in
all equilibria. I also discuss policy implications based on the comparison between the results in this
section and the ones in Section 3.
Players move sequentially in the stage game. In period t, player 1 chooses at ∈ A after observing
ht1. Before choosing bt ∈ B, player 2 observes a noisy private signal about at denoted by st ∈ S, the
entire history of player 2s’ past actions, and potentially, player 1’s actions in the past K periods, i.e.,
ht2 ≡ {st, b0, ..., bt−1, at−K , ..., at−1}.
22
Let f(·|at) be the conditional distribution of st, with f ≡ {f(·|a)}a∈A.
Let NE(δ, π0,K, f) be the set of Bayes Nash Equilibria. Let SE(δ, π0,K, f) be the set of strategy
22My results in this section applies to all values of K, including K = 0. They also apply when player 2s observe player
1’s past actions according to a stochastic network that satisfies Assumption 3. Whether player 1 observes st or not is
irrelevant for my results.
5 PRIVATE SIGNALS ABOUT CURRENT PERIOD ACTION 27
profiles that are part of some sequential equilibria. Let
V 1(δ, π0,K, f) ≡ inf
(σ1,σ2)∈NE(δ,pi0,K,f)
E
(σ1,σ2)
1
[ ∞∑
t=0
(1− δ)δtu1(at, bt)
]
. (5.1)
be player 1’s worst equilibrium payoff in Bayes Nash Equilibrium.
I start from games in which player 1’s action choice is binary, i.e., |A| = 2, while |B| and |S| can
be any finite integer. I characterize the set of f such that a patient player 1 can secure his Stackelberg
payoff in all BNEs. For given a ∈ A, I say that f is unboundedly informative about a if there exists
s ∈ S such that f(s|a˜) > 0 if and only if a˜ = a. Otherwise, f is boundedly informative about a.
Theorem 4. Suppose |A| = 2.
1. If f is unboundedly informative about a∗, then for every K ∈ N ∪ {0} and π0 > 0,
lim inf
δ→1
V 1(δ, π0,K, f) ≥ u1(a
∗, b∗). (5.2)
2. If f is boundedly informative about a∗ and players’ stage-game payoffs satisfy Assumptions 1 and
2, then for every K ∈ N ∪ {0}, there exists π0 ∈ (0, 1) such that for every π0 ∈ (0, π0) and δ
large enough, there exists (σδ1, σ
δ
2) ∈ SE(δ, π0,K, f), such that:
E
(σδ
1
,σδ
2
)
1
[ ∞∑
t=0
(1− δ)δtu1(at, bt)
]
= v1. (5.3)
Theorem 4 suggests that in games where |A| = 2 and player 1’s Stackelberg payoff is strictly greater
than v1, player 1 can secure his Stackelberg payoff if and only if player 2’s private signal about his
action is unboundedly informative. Intuitively, observing an unboundedly informative signal about
at guarantees a lower bound on the speed of social learning. It accelerates the process of reputation
building, making it worthwhile for player 1 to establish a good reputation. When st is boundedly
informative about a∗, the speed with which player 1 builds his reputation can be arbitrarily low, and
vanishes to zero as player 1 becomes patient. Similar to Theorem 1, the prolonged learning process
wipes out a patient player 1’s gains from building reputations, and consumers’ social learning cannot
provide adequate incentives for a patient seller to establish good reputations.
The requirement of unboundedly informative signals is reminiscent of a well-known result in Smith
and Sørensen (2000), that in canonical social learning models, myopic players’ actions are asymptot-
ically efficient if and only if the private signals they observe are unboundedly informative about the
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payoff-relevant state.23 Compared to their results, Theorem 4 is conceptually different for two reasons.
First, as hinted by Theorem 1 and Proposition 3, converging to a high-payoff outcome asymptot-
ically is insufficient for player 1 to receive a high discounted average payoff, no matter how close his
discount factor is to 1. This is demonstrated by the constructed equilibria in the proof of Theorem 1,
in which a patient player’s discounted average payoff is low despite his asymptotic payoff is high.
Second, in my model, the short-run players learn about the endogenous actions of a strategic
long-run player, while in Smith and Sørensen (2000), they learn about an exogenous state. Even when
f is unboundedly informative about a∗, there is no guarantee that bt is informative about at, or bt
is informative about player 1’s type in periods where player 1 receives a low stage-game payoff. An
example is provided later in this section, in which f is unboundedly informative about a∗, but bt is
uninformative about at and ω despite b
∗ is played with low ex ante probability.
In addition, a technical difficulty arises when K ≥ 1. Player 2s in my model can entertain heteroge-
nous beliefs about the informativeness of a public signal (i.e., previous short-run players’ actions), while
in Smith and Sørensen (2000), the informativeness of each public signal is commonly known among
players. Intuitively, each short-run player privately observes the long-run player’s actions in the last
K periods, which are not observed by other short-run players. Due to the potential serial correlation
in player 1’s actions, the informativeness of bt about at can be different under the private beliefs of
different short-run players.
My proof in Appendix C addresses these concerns using three observations. First, regardless of
player 2’s prior belief about player 1’s action, she has a strict incentive to play b∗ after observing the
signal realization that occurs only when a = a∗. This highlights the role of unboundedly informative
private signals, which contrasts to private signals with bounded informativeness and the baseline model
in which player 2s do not receive any private signal about player 1’s current-period action.
Second, when player 1’s action choice is binary and f is unboundedly informative about a∗,
Pr(bt = b
∗|at = a
∗)
Pr(bt = b∗|at 6= a∗)
is strictly bounded above 1 whenever the ex ante probability of bt = b
∗ is bounded away from 1. From
the perspective of period t short-run player, it bounds the informativeness of bt about at from below.
23My result does not follow from Mirrlees (1976) who shows that in principal-agent models, the principal can implement
the first best outcome when there exists a signal realization that occurs with zero probability when the agent takes the
first-best action and occurs with positive probability otherwise. This is because in my model, the rewards and punishments
to player 1 are dictated by future player 2s’ behaviors. Depending on the equilibrium being played, there are multiple
ways that the signal realizations are mapped into player 1’s continuation payoffs. When δ is close to 1, it is unclear
whether player 1 has an incentive to play a∗ and attain his Stackelberg payoff u1(a
∗, b∗) in all equilibria.
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Third, if the ex ante probability that bt = b
∗ is bounded away from 1 and bt is informative about
player 1’s type according to player 2’s private belief in period t, then the informativeness of bt about
ω is also uniformly bounded from below according to the private beliefs of all future player 2s. To
understand why this is true, suppose in period t, player 2 observes that a∗ has been played in the last
K periods, and believes that b∗ will be played with probability at most 1 − ǫ, then the probability
with which (at−K , ..., at−1) = (a
∗, ..., a∗) under the equilibrium strategy profile is bounded from below.
Otherwise, period t player 2 believes that the commitment type occurs with probability close to 1
after observing (at−K , ..., at−1) = (a
∗, ..., a∗), so the probability that she plays b∗ in period t cannot
be bounded away from 1. Therefore, the probability with which player 2 in period s believes that
(at−K , ..., at−1) = (a
∗, ..., a∗) occurring with very low probability is uniformly bounded from above.
As a result, any lower bound on bt’s informativeness about ω from the perspective of period t player
2 leads to a lower bound on its informativeness from the perspectives of all future player 2s.
Games with |A| ≥ 3: In games where player 1 has three or more actions, the equivalence be-
tween high returns from building reputations and unboundedly informative signals breaks down. To
illustrate, consider the following 2× 3 game:
- b∗ b′
a 1, 4 −2, 0
a∗ 2, 1 −1, 0
a 3,−2 0, 0
Let S ≡ {s, s∗, s}, with f(s∗|a∗) = 2/3, f(s|a∗) = 1/3, f(s|a) = 1, f(s|a) = 1/3, and f(s|a) = 2/3.
One can verify that players’ payoffs are monotone-supermodular when player 1’s actions are ranked
according to a ≻ a∗ ≻ a and player 2’s actions are ranked according to b∗ ≻ b′. These payoffs also
satisfy Assumptions 1 and 2, and f is unboundedly informative about a∗. Player 1’s pure Stackelberg
action is a∗, and his pure Stackelberg payoff is 2.
Consider the following strategy profile. Strategic-type player 1 plays a mixed action that depends
only on player 2’s posterior belief about his type. If player 2’s posterior belief assigns probability π to
the commitment type, then the strategic-type player 1 plays α(π) ∈ ∆(A), which is pinned down by:
(1− π) ◦ α(π) + π ◦ a∗ = 0.5 ◦ a∗ + 0.25 ◦ a+ 0.25 ◦ a.
Player 2 plays b∗ if st ∈ {s
∗, s} and plays b′ if st = s.
Player 1’s payoff under this strategy profile is 1, which is strictly below his pure Stackelberg payoff
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2. This strategy profile is an equilibrium since player 1’s expected stage-game payoff is 1 no matter
which action he plays, and his continuation payoff is independent of the action he takes. Player 2 has
a strict incentive to play b∗ after observing s or s∗, and has an incentive to play b′ after observing s.
Conditional on each type of player 1, the probability with which player 2 plays b∗ is 2/3.
In this example, bt is uninformative about at despite f is unboundedly informative about a
∗ and
the ex ante probability that bt = b
∗ is bounded away from 1. This is driven by the heterogeneity
in player 2’s incentive to play b∗ against different actions of player 1’s. In particular, player 2 has a
stronger incentive to play b∗ when player 1 plays a than when player 1 plays a∗. As a result, player
2 has an incentive to play b∗ following a signal realization s that occurs with lower probability under
a∗, and has an incentive to play b′ following a signal realization s that occurs with higher probability
under a∗. This concern never arises when |A| = 2 given there is only one action in A that is not the
Stackelberg action, but can happen in games where |A| ≥ 3.
Motivated by the applications in retail markets, I focus on games with monotone-supermodular
payoffs and extend Theorem 4 to games in which player 1 can have any number of actions, and the
distribution of s satisfies a standard monotone likelihood ratio property (or MLRP).24
Condition 3. For a given complete order on player 1’s action set A, f has MLRP if there exists
a complete order on S, such that for every a ≻ a′ and s ≻ s′,
f(s|a)
f(s′|a)
≥
f(s|a′)
f(s′|a′)
. (5.4)
In applications to retail markets where a patient seller chooses the quality he supplies and each
buyer along a sequence chooses whether to trust the seller after observing an informative private signal
about the seller’s action in the current period, MLRP requires the buyers’ private signal realizations
to be ranked such that a higher signal realization indicates that the product is of higher quality.
When player 1’s actions are ranked according to a ≻ a∗ ≻ a, the signal distribution f in the
previous example violates MLRP regardless of the complete order on S. This is because s occurs with
strictly positive probability under a and a, but occurs with zero probability under a∗.
Theorem 4’. Suppose players’ payoffs are monotone-supermodular and f satisfies MLRP.
1. If f is unboundedly informative about a∗, then for every K ∈ N ∪ {0} and π0 > 0,
lim infδ→1 V 1(δ, π0,K, f) ≥ u1(a
∗, b∗).
24General necessary and sufficient conditions for positive reputation results are provided in a companion paper.
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2. If f(·|a) has full support for every a ∈ A and players’ payoffs satisfy Assumption 1, then for
every K ∈ N ∪ {0}, there exists π0 ∈ (0, 1) such that for every π0 ∈ (0, π0) and δ large enough,
there exists (σδ1, σ
δ
2) ∈ SE(δ, π0,K, f), such that:
E
(σδ
1
,σδ
2
)
1
[ ∞∑
t=0
(1− δ)δtu1(at, bt)
]
= v1.
Theorem 4’ suggests that in games with monotone-supermodular payoffs and the signal distribu-
tions satisfy the MLRP, f being unboundedly informative about a∗ is sufficient and almost necessary
for player 1 to secure his Stackelberg payoff in all equilibria of the reputation game. The 2× 3 game
example earlier in this section demonstrates why the MLRP requirement is indispensable. In Appendix
C.4, I use an example to explain why the full support condition in statement 2 of Theorem 4’ cannot
be replaced by bounded informativeness when player 1 has three or more actions.
The proof is similar to that of Theorem 4, with the differences explained in Appendix C.3. For
statement 1, the key is to show that under monotone-supermodular payoffs, unboundedly informative
signals, and MLRP, for every prior belief about player 1’s action α ∈ ∆(A) with a∗ ∈ supp(α), and
every best reply β : S → ∆(B) of player 2’s against α after observing the realization of s, if the
ex ante probability that b∗ is played is bounded away from 1, then the relative entropy between the
distribution over b induced by (α, β) and that induced by (a∗, β) is bounded away from 0.
I explain the role of unbounded informativeness and MLRP in deriving this reputation result. Since
players’ payoffs are monotone-supermodular and f satisfies MLRP, player 2 has an incentive to play
b∗ only when the realization of s belongs to some interval [s, s]. Since f is unboundedly informative,
there exists s∗ such that f(s∗|a) > 0 if and only if a = a∗, i.e., the probability that s 6= s∗ is strictly
lower when player 1 plays a∗ compared to any other action. MLRP also implies that the likelihood
ratio between s ∈ (s∗, s] and s > s is decreasing in a, and the likelihood ratio between s ∈ [s, s∗) and
s < s is increasing in a. As a result, for any α′ ∈ ∆(A\{a∗}) and β : S → ∆(B) that is non-decreasing
in s and is not constantly b∗ in the support of f(·|α′), the probability with which player 2 plays b∗ is
strictly higher when player 1 plays a∗ relative to α′. This implies that player 2’s action is informative
about player 1’s type as long as her ex ante probability of playing b∗ is bounded away from 1.
6 Concluding Remarks
This paper examines a long-run player’s incentive to build reputations when his opponents have limited
observations of his past actions, and instead, learn primarily from other short-run players’ actions. I
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identify a new mechanism that accounts for reputation failures based on slow learning, which arises
when each short-run player observes a bounded subset of the long-run player’s past actions. I also
establish a reputation result when each short-run player observes an unboundedly informative private
signal about the long-run player’s action in the current period.
My results provide an explanation to instances of reputation failures observed in developing
economies. They also shed light on the effectiveness of various policies in accelerating social learning
and encouraging sellers to build reputations.
For example, Theorems 1 and 3 suggest that marginal improvements in record-keeping technologies
that allow each buyer to observe a longer history of the seller’s past actions (i.e., increasing K to
another finite number) is ineffective. This is especially the case when there is widespread mistrust
between buyers and sellers before the policy intervention (i.e., π0 is low). In particular, the market
may get stuck in a bad equilibrium in which the rate of trust building is slow, and in response, patient
sellers have weak incentives to build reputations, making buyers’ pessimistic beliefs self-fulfilling.
Theorems 4 and 4’ suggest that in markets where reputation mechanisms break down due to the
lack of record keeping, randomly inspecting a small fraction of products that are currently sold on
the market and issuing quality certificates to the inspected products can restore the patient seller’s
incentives to supply high quality. As long as the quality certificate can be observed by one buyer, its
informational content affects future buyers’ decisions via this buyer’s action. For such a policy to be
effective, the regulator needs to ensure that the certificate given to the high quality products cannot
be forged and cannot be used on low-quality products (i.e., the quality certificate is unboundedly
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A Proofs in Section 3
A.1 Proof of Theorem 2 & Corollary 2
I show Theorem 2. For Corollary 2, notice that (a, b) is the unique Nash Equilibrium of the stage
game, one can obtain a constructive proof to Corollary 2 by replacing (a′′, b′′) with (a, b).
First, consider the case in which u1(a
′′, b′′) = u1(a
∗, b∗). Assumption 1 implies that (a′′, b′′) =
(a∗, b∗), and the discounted average welfare of player 2 equals u2(a
′′, b′′) in a pooling equilibrium in
which (a∗, b∗) is played at every on-path history.
Next, consider the nontrivial case in which u1(a
′′, b′′) < u1(a
∗, b∗). Consider a similar equilibrium
as the proof of Theorem 1 except for two differences: first, replace (a′, b′) with (a′′, b′′), and second,
calibrate the probability with which strategic-type player 1 playing a∗ in the reputation-building phase
such that the unconditional probability of a∗ equals q∗ at every reputation-building phase history. This
is feasible given that player 1 knows player 2’s belief about his type at every on-path history. Let V2
be player 2’s discounted average welfare in the reputation-building phase (with discount factor δs):
V2 = (1− δs)
{
q∗u2(a
∗, b′′)+ (1− q∗)u2(a
′′, b′′)
}
+ δs
{
(1− q∗)V2+ q
∗(1− r)V2+ q
∗ru2(a
∗, b∗)
}
, (A.1)
where
r ≡
1− δ
δ
u1(a
′′, b′′)− u1(a
∗, b′′)
u1(a∗, b∗)− u1(a′′, b′′)
(A.2)
is the transition probability between phases that makes strategic-type player 1 indifferent between
playing a∗ and a′′ in the reputation-building phase. Equation (A.1) yields:
V2
{
1− δs(1− q
∗)− δsq
∗(1− r)
}
= δsq
∗ru2(a
∗, b∗)+ (1− δs)
(
q∗u2(a
∗, b′′)+ (1− q∗)u2(a
′′, b′′)
)
. (A.3)
Since q∗ can be arbitrarily low, when q∗ converges to 0, (A.3) reduces to V2(1−δs) = u2(a
′′, b′′)(1−δs),
which implies that V2 is arbitrarily close to u2(a
′′, b′′) as q∗ and π0 become arbitrarily small.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 3
Lower Bound: I establish inequality (3.5). For every β ∈ ∆(B) and a′ ≺ a∗, players’ payoffs
being monotone-supermodular implies that u1(a
∗, β) < u1(a
′, β). Strategic-type player 1 has a strict
incentive to play a′ instead of a∗ at public history ht if
||yt(·|a
∗, ht)− yt(·|a
′, ht)|| ≤
1− δ
2δ(u1 − u1)
(
u1(a
′, β)− u1(a
∗, β)
)
, (A.4)
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where yt(·|a, h
t) ∈ ∆(BK) is the distribution over (bt+1, ..., bt+K ) conditional on player 1 playing a
at ht, u1 and u1 are player 1’s highest and lowest feasible stage-game payoffs, and || · || is the total
variation norm. Let
∆ ≡
1− δ
2δ(u1 − u1)
min
β∈∆(B),a′≺a
{
u1(a
′, β) − u1(a
∗, β)
}
. (A.5)
Let H(a
∗,σ2) be the set of public histories that occur with positive probability when player 1 plays a∗
in every period and player 2 plays σ2. I partition H(a
∗,σ2) into two subsets, H
(a∗,σ2)
0 and H
(a∗,σ2)
1 :
1. if there exists a′ ≺ a∗ such that ||yt(·|a
∗, ht)− yt(·|a
′, ht)|| ≤ ∆, then ht ∈ H
(a∗,σ2)
0 ;
2. if ||yt(·|a
∗, ht)− yt(·|a
′, ht)|| ≥ ∆ for every a′ ≺ a∗, then ht ∈ H
(a∗,σ2)
1 .
For every ht ∈ H
(a∗,σ2)
0 , strategic-type player 1 has a strict incentive not to play a
∗ at ht, and
according to Proposition 2, σ2(h
t+τ ) = b∗ for every τ ∈ {1, 2, ...,K} and ht+τ ≻ ht with a∗ being
played from period t to t+ τ − 1. This implies that for every ht ∈ H
(a∗,σ2)
0 , we have:
1
t
E
(a∗,σ2)
[ t+K∑
s=t
u1(as, bs)
∣∣∣ht] ≥ K
K + 1
u1(a
∗, b∗) +
1
K + 1
min
(a,b)∈(A,B)
u1(a, b). (A.6)
For every ht ∈ H
(a∗,σ2)
1 , there exists a constant γ > 0 such that for every α ∈ ∆(A) such that b ≺ b
∗
best replies against α, we have ||yt(·|a
∗, ht)− yt(·|α, h
t)|| ≥ γ∆. The Pinsker’s Inequality implies that
d
(
yt(·|α, h
t)
∥∥∥yt(·|a∗, ht)) ≥ 2γ2∆2. (A.7)
for every such α ∈ ∆(A). For every Bayes Nash Equilibrium (σ1, σ2) and every τ ∈ {0, 1, ...,K},
E
(a∗,σ2)
[ ∞∑
s=0
d
(
ys(K+1)+τ (·|σ1(h
s(K+1)+τ ), hs(K+1)+τ )
∥∥∥ys(K+1)+τ (·|a∗, hs(K+1)+τ ))] ≤ − log π0. (A.8)
Inequalities (A.7) and (A.8) together imply that:
E
(a∗,σ2)
[ ∞∑
s=0
1
{
hs(K+1)+τ ∈ H
(a∗,σ2)
1 and σ2(h
s(K+1)+τ ) ≺ b∗
}]
≤ −
log π0
2γ2∆2
(A.9)
I derive a lower bound for lim inft→∞
1
t
E
(a∗,σ2)
[∑t−1
s=0 u1(as, bs)
]
using (A.6) and (A.9). For every
τ ∈ {0, 1, ...,K}, let
Hτ0 ≡
{
ht
∣∣∣∃hs(K+1)+τ ∈ H(a∗,σ2)0 such that ht  hs(K+1)+τ and t ∈ [s(K + 1), s(K + 1) +K]},
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let
Hτ1 ≡
{
hs(K+1)+τ ∈ H
(a∗,σ2)
1
∣∣∣s ∈ N},
and let Hτ ≡ Hτ0 ∪H
τ
1 . By definition, H
(a∗,σ2) =
⋃K
τ=0H
τ . An important observation is that for every
τ, τ ′ ∈ {0, 1, ...,K} with τ 6= τ ′,
Hτ1 ∩H
τ ′
1 = {∅} and H
τ
0 ∩H
τ ′
0 = {∅}. (A.10)
The former is straightforward. For the latter, suppose toward a contradiction that ht ∈ Hτ0 ∩H
τ ′
0 with
τ < τ ′, there exist hs and hs+τ
′−τ such that ht % hs+τ
′−τ ≻ hs, hs ∈ Hτ0 , t − s ≤ K, and s − τ is
divisible by K+1. On one hand hs ∈ Hτ0 and τ
′− τ ≤ K implies that σ1(h
s+τ ′−τ ) = a∗. On the other
hand hs+1 ∈ Hτ
′
0 implies that σ1(h
s+τ ′−τ ) 6= a∗. This leads to a contradiction.
For every τ ∈ {0, 1, ...,K}, inequality (A.6) implies that player 1’s expected average payoff at
histories in Hτ0 is at least
K
K+1u1(a
∗, b∗) + 1
K+1 min(a,b)∈(A,B) u1(a, b). Since H
τ
0 ∩ H
τ ′
0 = {∅} for
every τ 6= τ ′, it implies that player 1’s expected average payoff at histories in
⋃K
τ=0H
τ
0 is at least
K
K+1u1(a
∗, b∗) + 1
K+1 min(a,b)∈(A,B) u1(a, b). For every τ ∈ {0, 1, ...,K}, (A.9) implies that player 1’s
expected average payoff at histories in
Hτ1
∖ K⋃
s=0
Hs0
is at least u1(a
∗, b∗). Since Hτ1∩H
τ ′
1 = {∅} for every τ 6= τ
′, it implies that player 1’s expected average
payoff at histories in
K⋃
s=0
Hs1
∖ K⋃
s=0
Hs0
is at least u1(a
∗, b∗). The two parts together imply that
lim inf
t→∞
1
t
E
(a∗,σ2)
[ t−1∑
s=0
u1(as, bs)
]
≥
K
K + 1
u1(a
∗, b∗) +
1
K + 1
min
b∈B
u1(a
∗, b).
Tightness: I construct a sequential equilibrium in which player 1’s asymptotic payoff equals the
RHS of (3.6). At every on-path history (the set of which can be derived recursively using players’
strategies at on-path histories specified below):
• if t is divisible by K + 1, then player 1 plays a′ and player 2 plays b′ in period t;
• if t is not divisible by K + 1, then player 1 plays a∗ and player 2 plays b∗ in period t.
I partition off-path histories into three subsets. For every period t public history such that:
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• (1) there exists no r < t, such that br 6= b
∗ and r is not divisible by K + 1; (2) there exists no
s < t such that bs 6= b
′ and s is divisible by K + 1; (3) player 2 observes player 1’s off-path
deviation in period t− 1, then players play (a∗, b∗) if t is divisible by K +1, and play (a′, b′) if t
is not divisible by K + 1.
• (1) there exists no r < t, such that br 6= b
∗ and r is not divisible by K + 1, but (2) there exists
s < t such that bs 6= b
′ and s is divisible by K + 1. Let s∗ be the smallest of such s. If t− 1 is
not divisible by K + 1, then players play (a∗, b∗) in period t. If t− 1 is divisible by K + 1, then
players play (a∗, b∗) in period t if and only if ξt > 1/2 and play (a
′, b′) in period t otherwise.
• there exists r < t, such that br 6= b
∗ and r is not divisible by K + 1, then players play (a′, b′).
Such an arrangement is incentive compatible when δ is above some cutoff.
A.3 Sufficient Conditions for Attaining Minmax Payoff
Focusing on games in which vmin1 < v1, I identify a sufficient condition under which player 1’s lowest
equilibrium payoff in the reputation game coincides with his minmax payoff.
Condition 4. There exists a minmax action β ∈ B∗ such that:
1. b∗ /∈ supp(β),
2. there exists α ∈ ∆(A) with a∗ ∈ supp(α) such that β best replies against α,
3. u1(α, β) ≥ u1(a
∗, β).
Condition 3 requires that first, there exists a minmax action that excludes the Stackelberg best
reply b∗ in its support. Second, β best replies against a (potentially mixed) action of player 1’s that
includes the Stackelberg action in its support. Third, playing the Stackelberg action against β yields
player 1 a weakly lower payoff compared to playing α. The first and third part of this condition is
satisfied when the Stackelberg action is costly for player 1 regardless of player 2’s action, and player
2s’ Stackelberg best reply is always beneficial to player 1. The second part of condition 3 is satisfied
for generic (u1, u2), since it only requires β to be a strict best reply against some α ∈ ∆(A).
I provide an example in which vmin1 < v1 and players’ stage-game payoffs satisfy Condition 3 and
Assumptions 1 and 2:
A PROOFS IN SECTION 3 37
– L C R
U 1, 1 0, 0 −2, 0
M 2, 0 0, 0 −1, 1
B 0, 0 1/2, 1/2 0, 0
Action R belongs to B∗ since R is a strict best reply against M , and therefore, best replies against any
mixed action in which the probability ofM is close to 1. Player 1’s worst stage-game Nash equilibrium
payoff is 1/2, his pure Stackelberg payoff is 1, and his minmax payoff is 0. When player 2 plays her
minmax action R, player 1’s payoff from playing M is strictly greater than his payoff from playing U .
The following theorem extends Theorem 1, with proof in Appendix A.3:
Theorem 1’. When players’ stage-game payoffs satisfy Assumptions 1 and 2 and Condition 3.
For every K ∈ N, there exists π0 ∈ (0, 1), such that for every π0 ∈ (0, π0) and δ ≥ δ, there exists
(σδ1, σ
δ
2) ∈ SE(δ, π0,K), such that:
E
(σδ
1
,σδ
2
)
1
[ ∞∑
t=0
(1− δ)δtu1(at, bt)
]
= vmin1 .
Proof. When u1(a
∗, b∗) = vmin1 , (a
∗, b∗) is the unique pure strategy Nash Equilibrium of the stage
game. An equilibrium that attains payoff vmin1 is that both players play (a
∗, b∗) at every history.
Next, I focus on the interesting case in which u1(a
∗, b∗) > vmin1 . Recall the definitions of α and β
in Condition 3. Let q∗ be the probability that α attaches to a∗. Let π0 ∈ (0, 1) be small enough such
that:
π0
1− π0
≤
( q∗
2− q∗
)K+1
. (A.11)
For every π0 ∈ (0, π0) and δ large enough, I construct the following three-phase equilibrium in which
strategic-type player 1 attains payoff v1. The current phase of play depends only on the history of
player 2s’ actions, which are commonly observed by both players. In period t,
1. play is in the reputation building phase if there exists no s < t such that bs = b
∗;
2. play is in the reputation maintenance phase if (1) there exists s < t such that bs = b
∗, and (2)
there exists no τ ∈ {s∗ + 1, ..., t − 1} such that bτ 6= b
∗, where s∗ is the smallest s with bs = b
∗;
3. play is in the punishment phase if (1) there exists s < t such that bs = b
∗, and (2) there exists
τ ∈ {s∗ + 1, ..., t − 1} such that bτ 6= b
∗, where s∗ is the smallest s such that bs = b
∗.
Play starts from the reputation building phase, and gradually reaches the reputation maintenance
phase. Play reaches the punishment phase only at off-path histories.
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Equilibrium Strategies: At every history ht of the reputation-building phase,
• If t = 0, then player 2 plays β and strategic type player 1 plays α0 that satisfies:
(1− π0)α0 + π0a
∗ = α, (A.12)
Such α0 exists given that π0 < q
∗/2, which have been assumed in (A.11).
• If t ≥ 1 and ξt > r(at−1), then player 2 plays β and strategic type player 1 plays α(h
t) that
satisfies:
(1− π(ht))α(ht) + π(ht)a∗ = α, (A.13)
where π(ht) is the probability player 2’s belief at ht attaches to the commitment type. Such
α(ht) exists given that π(ht) < q∗/2, which I will verify by induction by the end of this proof.
• If t ≥ 1 and ξt ≤ r(at−1), then player 2 plays b
∗ and strategic type player 1 plays a∗.
The transition probability to the reputation maintenance phase is a function of player 1’s action in
the previous period r : A→ [0, 1], which is pinned down by the following equation:
(1− δ)u1(a, β) + δr(a)u1(a
∗, b∗) + δ(1 − r(a))max
a∈A
u1(a, β) = max
a∈A
u1(a, β). (A.14)
Given that u1(a
∗, b∗) > vmin1 , one can verify that (1) for every a, a
′ ∈ A, r(a) ≥ r(a′) if and only if
u1(a, β) ≤ u1(a
′, β), and (2) for every a ∈ A, r(a) is strictly between 0 and 1 when δ is large enough,
and as δ → 1, the value of r(a) converges to 0.
At every history of the reputation maintenance phase, If at−1 = a
∗, then player 1 plays a∗ and
player 2 plays b∗. If at−1 6= a
∗, then player 2 plays β and strategic-type player 1 plays α, after which
the continuation play enters the punishment phase. Player 1’s continuation value in the last period of
the reputation maintenance phase equals vmin1 .
25
Incentive Constraints: I verify players’ incentives constraints. To start with, when δ is large
enough,
u1(a
∗, b∗) ≥ (1− δ)max
a∈A
u1(a, b
∗) + δvmin1 .
This implies that player 1 has an incentive to play a∗ in the reputation maintenance phase when δ is
large enough. Next, given that player 1’s continuation value is u1(a
∗, b∗) in the reputation maintenance
25This can be achieved for example, by repeating the strategies in the reputation-building phase.
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phase and is vmin1 in the reputation building phase, (A.14) implies that player 1 is indifferent between
all of his actions in the reputation building phase.
Next, I verify player 2’s incentive to play β at the reputation building phase by showing that
(1) player 1’s reputation at every history of the reputation building phase is less than q∗/2, and (2)
α(ht) defined in (A.13) attaches probability at least q∗/2 to action a∗. According to (A.11), player
1’s reputation in period 0 is less than q∗/2 and according to (A.12), α(h0) attaches probability more
than q∗/2 to action a∗.
Suppose the conclusion holds for all reputation-building phase histories hs with s < t. If ht belongs
to the reputation building phase, then b∗ has never been played before given that player 2 plays β
in every period of the past given that b∗ /∈ supp(β). Player 2’s posterior belief about player 1 being
committed is 0 unless a∗ was played in the last min{K, t} periods, in which case her posterior belief
πt satisfies the following equation:
πt
1− πt
/ π0
1− π0
=
Pr(a
∗,σδ
2
)(a∗, ..., a∗)
Pr(σ
δ
1
,σδ
2
)(a∗, ..., a∗)
·
Pr(a
∗
1
,σδ
2
)(b0, ..., bt−1, ξt|a
∗, ..., a∗)
Pr(σ
δ
1
,σδ
2
)(b0, ..., bt−1, ξt|a∗, ..., a∗)
, (A.15)
where Pr(σ
δ
1
,σδ
2
)(·) is the probability measure induced by strategy profile (σδ1, σ
δ
2), and Pr
(a∗,σδ
2
)(·) is the
probability measure when player 1 plays a∗ in every period and player 2s’ strategy is σδ2.
Since the strategic type plays a∗ with probability q∗/2 in the reputation building phase, we have:
Pr(σ
δ
1
,σδ
2
)(a∗, ..., a∗|ωc)
Pr(σ
δ
1
,σδ
2
)(a∗, ..., a∗|ωs)
≤
( q∗
2− q∗
)−min{t,K}
≤
( q∗
2− q∗
)K
. (A.16)
Since u1(α, β) ≥ u1(a
∗, β), we have:
r(a∗) ≥ E[r(a˜)|α].
This implies that for every (b0, ..., bt−1) with bs ∈ supp(β) for every s, we have:
Pr(σ
δ
1
,σδ
2
)(b0, ..., bt−1, ξt|a
∗, ..., a∗, ωc)
Pr(σ
δ
1
,σδ
2
)(b0, ..., bt−1, ξt|a∗, ..., a∗, ωs)
≤ 1. (A.17)
Since pi01−pi0 ≤
pi0
1−pi0
=
(
q∗
2−q∗
)K+1
, (A.15), (A.16) and (A.17) together imply that πt ≤
q∗
2 . As a result,
the probability with which player 2 believes player 1 playing a∗ is at most q
∗
2 + (1−
q∗
2 )
q∗
2 ≤ q
∗. This
completes the verification of player 2s’ incentives.
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B Proof of Theorem 3
In Appendix B.1, I relax the monotone-supermodularity condition on payoffs, and identify weaker
sufficient conditions for my result. My sufficient conditions are satisfied not only in games with
monotone-supermodular payoffs, but also in coordination games, common interest games, and many
other games studied in the reputation literature. I state a Theorem 3’ that generalizes Theorem 3 to
a larger class of payoff structures. The proof of Theorem 3’ is in Appendices B.2 and B.3.
B.1 Relax Monotone-Supermodularity
Recall that a∗ is player 1’s pure Stackelberg action and b∗ is player 2’s unique best reply against
a∗. Let a′′ be the unique element in BR1(b
∗). If a′′ 6= a∗, then b∗ /∈ BR2(a
′′). This is because
u1(a
′′, b∗) > u1(a
∗, b∗), and b∗ best replying against a′′ implies that committing to a′′ yields player 1
a strictly higher payoff, contradicting the definition of a∗. Let p∗ be the largest p ∈ [0, 1] such that:
{b∗} 6= BR2
(
pa∗1 + (1− p)a
′′
)
.
This suggests the existence of b′′ 6= b∗ such that b′′ ∈ BR2
(
p∗a∗1+(1− p
∗)a′′
)
. My first requirement is:
u1(a
′′, b′′) ≥ u1(a
∗, b′′). (B.1)
Recall that (a′, b′) is player 1’s worst stage-game Nash equilibrium, which is strict under Assumption
1. When a′ 6= a∗, b′ /∈ BR2(a
∗). This is because otherwise, b′ ∈ BR2(a
∗), and given that b∗ ∈
BR2(a
∗), Assumption 1 implies that b∗ = b′. As a result, (a′, b∗) is a stage-game Nash Equilibrium,
and Assumption 1 implies that u1(a
′, b∗) > u1(a
∗, b∗), i.e., player 1 obtains strictly higher payoff by
committing to a′ compared to committing to a∗. This contradicts the presumption that a∗ is player
1’s pure Stackelberg action. Let q∗ be the smallest q ∈ [0, 1] such that:
{b′} 6= BR2
(
qa∗1 + (1− q)a
′
)
.
This suggests the existence of b∗∗ 6= b′ such that b∗∗ ∈ BR2
(
q∗a∗1 + (1 − q
∗)a′
)
. My second and third
requirements are:
u1(a
′, b∗∗) ≥ u1(a
∗, b∗∗), (B.2)
and
u1(a
′′, b∗)− u1(a
∗, b∗) ≥ u1(a
′, b∗∗)− u1(a
∗, b∗∗). (B.3)
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I introduce two classes of games, starting from games with strict lack-of-commitment.
Definition 1. (u1, u2) is a game with strict lack-of-commitment if (a
∗, b∗) is not a Nash Equilib-
rium, and players’ payoffs satisfy (B.1), (B.2), and (B.3).
Under Assumption 1, the requirement that (a∗, b∗) is not a Nash Equilibrium implies that a∗ 6= a′
and a∗ 6= a′′, i.e., the Stackelberg action is strictly suboptimal for player 1 both when player 2 plays
her Stackelberg best reply b∗ and when she plays her Nash equilibrium action b′. Actions a′ and a′′ are
player 1’s best replies to these player 2’s actions, where a′ and a′′ can potentially coincide. Inequality
(B.1) requires that player 1 benefits from deviating to a′′ not only when player 2 plays b∗, but also
when player 2 plays b′′, her best reply when she faces uncertainty about whether player 1 will play a∗
or a′′. Inequality (B.2) requires that player 1 benefits from deviating to a′ not only when player 2 plays
b′, but also when player 2 plays b∗∗, her best reply when she faces uncertainty about whether player 1
will play a∗ or a′. Inequality (B.3) requires that player 1’s benefit from cheating is larger when player
2 plays her Stackelberg best reply. Lemma B.1 shows that games with strict lack-of-commitment
contains games with monotone-supermodular payoffs.
Lemma B.1. When a game’s stage-game payoffs are monotone-supermodular, then it is a game
with strict lack-of-commitment.
Proof of Lemma B.1: Since u1(a, b) is strictly decreasing in a, we have a
′ = a′′ = a. Since a∗ 6= a, we
have a∗ 6= a′ and a∗ 6= a′′. Since a∗ ≻ a′ and a∗ ≻ a′′, we obtain (B.1) and (B.2). By construction,
p∗ ≥ q∗. Since u2(a, b) has strictly increasing differences in a and b, we have b
∗  b∗∗. Given that
a∗ ≻ a = a′ = a′′ and u1(a, b) has strictly decreasing differences in a and b, which yields (B.3).
Next, I define generalized coordination games.
Definition 2. (u1, u2) is a general coordination game if (a
∗, b∗) is a Nash Equilibrium.
When player 1’s Stackelberg outcome is a Nash Equilibrium, either a∗ = a′ or a∗ = a′′ or both. This
can be further categorized into two subclasses: trivial games in which the pure Stackelberg outcome
coincides with the worst pure strategy Nash equilibrium (for example, prisoner’s dilemma), games
that have at least two pure-strategy Nash Equilibria. When (a∗, b∗) is a Nash Equilibrium, it must
be player 1’s favorite Nash Equilibrium, while (a′, b′) is player 1’s least favorite Nash Equilibrium.
This includes for example, battle of sexes, chicken games, and common interest coordination games
in which different equilibria can be Pareto ranked. Theorem 3’ generalizes Theorem 3 to games with
strict lack-of-commitment and generalized coordination games.
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Theorem 3’. If the monitoring structure N satisfies Assumption 3 and the stage game satisfies
Assumption 1, and is either a game with strict lack-of-commitment or a generalized coordination
game, then there exists π0 ∈ (0, 1), such that for every π0 ∈ (0, π0) and δ large enough, there exists
(σδ1, σ
δ
2) ∈ SE(δ, π0,N ), such that:
E
(σδ
1
,σδ
2
)
1
[ ∞∑
t=0
(1− δ)δtu1(at, bt)
]
= v1.
B.2 Proof of Theorem 3’: Games with Strict Lack-of-Commitment
The constructed equilibrium consists of three phases: a reputation building phase, a reputation main-
tenance phase, and a punishment phase, which depends only on the history of player 2’s actions that
is commonly observed by both players. In period t,
• play is in the reputation building phase if t = 0 or (b0, ..., bt−1) = (b
′, ..., b′);
• play is in the reputation maintenance phase if first, there exists s ≤ t− 1 such that bs = b
∗∗, and
second, (bs∗+1, ..., bt−1) = (b
∗, ..., b∗) where s∗ is the smallest s ∈ N such that bs = b
∗∗.
• play is in the punishment phase if first, there exists s ≤ t − 1 such that bs = b
∗∗, and second,
(bs∗+1, ..., bt−1) 6= (b
∗, ..., b∗) where s∗ is the smallest s ∈ N such that bs = b
∗∗.
Play starts from the reputation building phase, and eventually ends up in the reputation maintenance
phase or the punishment phase. Different from the construction in Theorem 1, the punishment phase
is reached with strictly positive probability due to private monitoring and private learning. In what
follows, I describe players’ strategies and verify their incentive constraints in each of the three phases.
By the end of this proof, I verify the promise keeping condition for player 1.
Punishment Phase: At every punishment phase history, player 1 plays a′ and player 2 plays b′. As
will become clear after describing the reputation maintenance phase, play never reaches the punishment
phase conditional on player 1 being committed. This implies the existence of an assessment that is
consistent with the equilibrium strategy profile and attaches probability 1 to the strategic type at
every punishment-phase history. This verifies players’ incentive constraints in the punishment phase.
Reputation Maintenance Phase: Let s∗ be the smallest s such that bs = b
∗∗. In period t ≥ s∗+2,
• If at−1 = a
∗, then strategic-type player 1 plays a∗.
If at−1 6= a
∗, then strategic-type player 1 plays p∗a∗1 + (1− p
∗)a′′.
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• If t− 1 /∈ Nt or at−1 = a
∗, then player 2 plays b∗.
If t − 1 ∈ Nt and at−1 6= a
∗, then player 2 plays β˜tb
∗ + (1 − β˜t)b
′′. Let β be the probability
with which player 2 plays b∗ conditional on at−1 6= a
∗ but unconditional on realization of Nt.
It is also the unconditional probability that play remains in the reputation maintenance phase
in period t + 1 given that at−1 6= a
∗. One can compute β and player 1’s continuation value in
period t when at−1 6= a
∗, denoted by V1, by solving the following system of quadratic equations:
V1 = (1− δ)u1(a
∗, βb∗ + (1− β)b′′) + δβu1(a
∗, b∗) + δ(1 − βt)u1(a
′, b′), (B.4)
V1 = (1− δ)u1(a
′′, βb∗ + (1− β)b′′) + δβV1 + δ(1 − βt)u1(a
′, b′). (B.5)
To understand (B.4) and (B.5), note that u1(a
∗, b∗) is player 1’s continuation value in period
t+1 when at = a
∗ and play remains in the reputation maintenance phase, and u1(a
′, b′) is player
1’s continuation value in period t+1 when play reaches the punishment phase. Player 2’s mixing
probability conditional on t− 1 ∈ Nt and at−1 6= a
∗ satisfies:
1− β = (1− β˜t) Pr(t− 1 ∈ Nt). (B.6)
Since Pr(t − 1 ∈ Nt) is uniformly bounded from below by γ > 0, β˜t ∈ (0, 1) when β > 1 − γ.
Lemma B.2 verifies that β converges to 1 as δ → 1, i.e., β > 1− γ when δ is large enough.
In period s∗ + 1,
• If as∗ = a
∗, then strategic-type player 1 plays a∗.
If as∗ 6= a
∗ and
ξs∗ > ξ ≡
u1(a
′, b∗∗)− u1(a
∗, b∗∗)
u1(a
′′, b∗)− u1(a
∗, b∗) +
1− β
β
(
u1(a
′′, b′′)− u1(a
∗, b′′)
) , (B.7)
then strategic-type player 1 plays a∗.
If as∗ 6= a
∗ and ξs∗ ≤ ξ, then strategic-type player 1 plays p
∗a∗1 + (1− p
∗)a′′.
• If s∗ /∈ Ns∗+1, or as∗ = a
∗, or ξs∗ satisfies (B.7), then player 2 plays b
∗.
If s∗ ∈ Ns∗+1, as∗ 6= a
∗, and ξs∗ does not satisfy (B.7), then player 2 plays β˜b
∗+(1− β˜)b′′, where
β˜ can be solved via (B.4), (B.5) and (B.6).
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To verify players’ incentive constraints in this phase, I only need to verify their incentives from period
s∗+2 and onwards. This is because the equilibrium play in period s∗+1 is a randomization between
the two automaton states from period s∗ + 2 and onwards.
I start from verifying player 2s’ incentives. According to the definition of p∗ in Appendix B.1,
player 2 is indifferent between b∗ and b′′ when her belief about player 1’s action is p∗a∗1 + (1 − p
∗)a′′.
In the constructed strategy for player 2s in the reputation maintenance phase,
• Player 2 randomizes between b∗ and b′ in period t only when she has observed at−1 6= a
∗, after
which her posterior belief attaches probability 0 to the commitment type, and therefore, believes
that player 1’s action is p∗a∗1 + (1− p
∗)a′′.
• Player 2 plays b∗ at other histories. This is incentive compatible since b∗ best replies against
pa∗1 + (1 − p)a
′′ for every p ∈ [p∗, 1], and given that the strategic type plays p∗a∗1 + (1 − p
∗)a′′,
the unconditional probability with which player 1 plays a∗ is between p and 1.
Next, I verify player 1’s incentives. I show that first, when at−1 = a
∗, player 1 has an incentive to
play a∗. This requires:
u1(a
∗, b∗) ≥ max
a6=a∗
{
(1− δ)u1(a, b
∗) + δV1
}
,
where V1 solves (B.4) and (B.5). Intuitively, V1 is player 1’s continuation value in the reputation
maintenance phase conditional on his previous period action is not a∗. Given that a′′ is player 1’s
stage-game best reply against b∗, the above inequality reduces to:
u1(a
∗, b∗)− V1 ≥
1− δ
δ
(u1(a
′′, b∗)− u1(a
∗, b∗)). (B.8)
Deduct the RHS of (B.4) from the RHS of (B.5), we obtain:
δβ(u1(a
∗, b∗)− V1) = (1− δ)β(u1(a
′′, b∗)− u1(a
∗, b∗)) + (1− δ)(1 − β)(u1(a
′′, b′′)− u1(a
∗, b′′)) (B.9)
Equation (B.9) implies that β > 0. This is because otherwise, u1(a
′′, b′′)−u1(a
∗, b′′) = 0, and given the
presumption that a∗ 6= a′′, this violates Assumption 1. According to (B.1), u1(a
′′, b′′)−u1(a
∗, b′′) ≥ 0,
and therefore, (B.9) implies (B.8).
Next, I show that when at−1 6= a
∗, player 1 has an incentive to mix between a∗ and a′′ in period
t. Since Nt is independent of {Ns}
t−1
s=0, and β is the probability with which player 2 plays b
∗ in period
t conditional on at−1 6= a
∗ but unconditional on the realization of Nt, player 1 believes that player 2
plays b∗ with probability β conditional on at−1 6= a
∗. Equations (B.4) and (B.5) imply that player 1 is
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indifferent between a∗ and a′′. What remains to be shown is that player 1 prefers a′′ to actions other
than a∗ and a′′. This hinges on the following lemma, implying that β is close to 1 when δ is close to 1.
Lemma B.2. For every γ ∈ (0, 1), there exists δ ∈ (0, 1), such that for every δ > δ, there exists
β ∈ (1− γ, 1) that solves (B.4) and (B.5).
The proof requires some algebra and is relegated to Appendix B.4. Since a′′ best replies against
b∗, Assumption 1 implies that a′′ is a strict best reply against b∗. Lemma B.2 implies that there exists
δ large enough such that a′′ best replies against βa∗ + (1− β)a′′. This suggests that player 1 receives
higher payoff by playing a′′ compared to actions other than a∗ and a′′.
Reputation Building Phase: First, I describe player 2s’ equilibrium strategy and verifies strategic-
type player 1’s incentive to mix between a∗ and a′ at every private history of the reputation building
phase. Second, I describe strategic-type player 1’s equilibrium strategy, and verifies player 2s’ incen-
tives to mix between b∗∗ and b′ at every private history of the reputation building phase.
Player 2s’ Strategy: Player 2 plays b′ if (1) t = 0, or (2) t−1 /∈ Nt, or (3) t−1 ∈ Nt but at−1 6= a
∗.
Player 2 plays ρ˜tb
∗∗+(1− ρ˜t)b
′ if t−1 ∈ Nt and at−1 = a
∗. Let ρ be the probability with which player
2 plays b∗∗ conditional on at−1 = a
∗ but unconditional on the realization of Nt. This probability ρ is
pinned down by the following equation:
V ′1 = (1− δ)u1(a
∗, ρb∗∗ + (1− ρ)b′) + δρu1(a
∗, b∗) + δ(1− ρ)V ′1 . (B.10)
where V ′1 is given by:
u1(a
′, b′) = (1− δ)u1(a
∗, b′) + δV ′1 . (B.11)
Player 2’s mixing probability conditional on t− 1 ∈ Nt and at−1 = a
∗, which is ρ˜t, satisfies:
ρ = ρ˜t Pr(t− 1 ∈ Nt), (B.12)
Since Pr(t−1 ∈ Nt) is uniformly bounded from below by γ, ρ˜t ∈ (0, 1) as long as ρ ∈ (0, γ). Lemma B.3
shows that ρ→ 0 as δ → 1. In what follows, I show that such mixing probabilities give strategic-type
player 1 an incentive to mix between a∗ and a′ at every reputation-building phase history.
First, u1(a
′, b′) is player 1’s continuation value in the reputation building phase when t = 0 or
at−1 6= a
∗. Equation (B.11) implies that player 1 is indifferent between a∗ and a′ when t = 0 or
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at−1 6= a
∗, and moreover, given that a′ is player 1’s stage-game best reply against b′, a′ yields strictly
higher payoff compared to actions other than a∗ and a′.
Next, recall that u1(a
∗, b∗) is player 1’s continuation payoff in the reputation maintenance phase
conditional on player 1 playing a∗ in the period before moving to the reputation maintenance phase;
and ξV1 + (1 − ξ)u1(a
∗, b∗) is player 1’s continuation payoff in the reputation maintenance phase
conditional on player 1 not playing a∗ in the period before moving to the reputation maintenance
phase, where V1 solves (B.4) and (B.5) and ξ is given by (B.7). At every reputation-building phase
history with at−1 = a
∗, player 1’s expected payoff from playing a∗ is given by the RHS of (B.10). His
expected payoff from playing a′ is:
(1− δ)u1(a
′, ρb∗∗ + (1− ρ)b′) + δρ
(
ξV1 + (1− ξ)u1(a
∗, b∗)
)
+ δ(1 − ρ)u1(a
′, b′). (B.13)
Let V ∗∗1 ≡ ξV1 + (1− ξ)u1(a
∗, b∗). Subtracting the RHS of (B.10) from (B.13), we obtain:
(1−δ)ρ(u1(a
∗, b∗∗)−u1(a
′, b∗∗))+(1−δ)(1−ρ)(u1(a
∗, b′)−u1(a
′, b′))+δρ(u1(a
∗, b∗)−V ∗∗1 )+δ(1−ρ)(V
′
1−u1(a
′, b′))
(B.14)
According to (B.11), (B.14) reduces to:
(1− δ)ρ(u1(a
∗, b∗∗)− u1(a
′, b∗∗)) + δρ(u1(a
∗, b∗)− V ∗∗1 ),
which equals 0 according to (B.7). This suggests that (B.13) equals the RHS of (B.10), and that the
strategic-type player 1 is indifferent between a∗ and a′. To show that player 1 strictly prefers a′ to
actions other than a∗ and a′, I establish the following lemma:
Lemma B.3. For every γ ∈ (0, 1), there exists δ ∈ (0, 1), such that for every δ > δ, there exists
ρ ∈ (0, γ) that solves (B.10) and (B.11).
Proof of Lemma B.3: According to (B.11), V ′1 converges to u1(a
′, b′) as δ → 1. According to (B.10)
(1− δ + δρ)V ′1 = (1− δ)u1(a
∗, ρb∗∗ + (1− ρ)b′) + δρu1(a
∗, b∗). (B.15)
Suppose toward a contradiction that there exists a sequence of {δn}
∞
n=1 with limn→∞ δn = 1 such
that limn→∞ ρn = ρ
∗ > 0. Then the LHS of (B.15) converges to ρ∗V ′1 while the RHS converges to
ρ∗u1(a
∗, b∗). Since V ′1 → u1(a
′, b′) and u1(a
′, b′) < u1(a
∗, b∗) in games with strict lack-of-commitment.
This yields a contradiction.
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Since a′ is a strict best reply against b′, there exists ε > 0 such that a′ best replies against
εb∗∗ + (1− ε)b′ for every ε ∈ (0, ε). Lemma B.3 implies that when δ is close to 1, a′ is player 1’s strict
best reply against ρb∗∗ + (1− ρ)b′, i.e., a′ yields player 1 a strictly higher payoff compared to actions
other than a∗ and a′.
Player 1’s Strategy: I start from the following Lemma:
Lemma B.4. For every K ∈ N, there exists M ∈ N, such that
2K
K∑
j=0
(
n
j
)
< 2n, for every n ≥M. (B.16)
Proof of Lemma B.4: To start with,
∑n
j=0
(
n
j
)
= 2n for every n ∈ N. Moreover,
(
n
j
)
is increasing in j
when j < n/2 and is decreasing in j when j > n/2. This suggests that for every m ≥ 2 and n > mK,
K∑
j=0
(
n
j
)
≤
2n
m
Let M ≡ 2KK, we have:
2K
K∑
j=0
(
n
j
)
<
2K+n
2K
= 2n.
Let η ∈ (0, 1/2) be a small enough real number which will be determined by the end of the
construction (Lemma B.5). Pick π0(η) ∈ (0, 1) small enough such that:
π0(η)
1− π0(η)
( 1
ηq∗
)M
<
ηq∗
1− ηq∗
. (B.17)
Recall the definitions of a′, b′, b∗∗, and q∗ in Appendix B.1. Player 1’s strategy in the reputation
building phase depends on calendar time, and in particular, the comparison between t and M . Let
p˜it ∈ ∆(Ω) be the posterior belief of a hypothetical observer who shares the same prior belief as
player 2s, but can observe the entire history of actions and public randomization devices, i.e., he
observes {a0, ..., at−1, b0, ..., bt−1, ξ0, ..., ξt}. Let π˜t be the probability p˜it attaches to the commitment
type. Player 1 can compute π˜t based on his private history, but player 2 cannot.
At every reputation-building phase history ht with t ≤ M , strategic-type player 1 mixes between
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a∗ and a′, with the probability of playing a∗ being q(ht1), satisfying:
(1− π˜t)q(h
t
1) + π˜t = q
∗. (B.18)
i.e., player 2 is indifferent between b∗∗ and b′ when she observes the entire history of actions and public
randomization devices.
I show that when π0 < π0(η), we have π˜t < ηq
∗ for every {a0, ..., at−1, b0, ..., bt−1, ξ0, ..., ξt} with
t ≤M . This is because π˜t is bounded from above by an observer’s belief who observes {a0, ..., at−1} =
{a∗, a∗, ..., a∗}. According to (B.18), q(ht1) > ηq
∗ when π˜t < ηq
∗, and therefore, π˜t+1 ≤
pit
ηq∗
. Applying
(B.17), one can then show inductively that π˜t < ηq
∗ for every t ≤ M . The above conclusion also
suggests that q(ht1) > ηq
∗ for every ht1 with t ≤M .
At every reputation-building phase history ht with t > M , strategic-type player 1 mixes between
a∗ and a′. The probability with which he plays a∗ depends on his private history only through
χt ≡ {χ0, ..., χt−1} ∈ X
t ≡ {0, 1}t, with
χs =

 1 if as = a
∗
0 if as 6= a
∗.
Let q(χt) be the probability with which strategic-type player 1 plays a∗, and let qt ≡ {q(χ
t)}χt∈{0,1}t .
For every ht2, let κ(h
t
2) ∈ ∆(Xt) be player 2’s belief about χ
t conditional on player 1 being the strategic
type. For every t > M , recall that π(ht2) is the probability player 2’s posterior belief attaches to the
commitment type when her private history is ht2. Let qt be such that:
π(ht2) + (1− π(h
t
2))κ(h
t
2) · qt = q
∗ for every ht2 ∈ H
t
2. (B.19)
When (B.19) is satisfied, player 2 believes that player 1 plays a∗ with probability q∗ and a′ with
probability 1 − q∗ at private history ht2, and is therefore, indifferent between b
∗∗ and b′. I show the
following lemma, which verifies player 2’s incentive constraints in the reputation building phase.
Lemma B.5. There exists η ∈ (0, 1/2) such that for every t > M , if q(χs) ∈ [ηq∗, 1 − ηq∗]
for every χs ∈ {0, 1}s with s ≤ t − 1, then there exists qt ∈ [0, 1]
2t that solves (B.19) and satisfies
q(χt) ∈ [ηq∗, 1− ηq∗] for every χt ∈ {0, 1}t.
Proof of Lemma B.5: First, I show that linear system (B.19), which is equivalent to
κ(ht2) · qt =
q∗ − π(ht2)
1− π(ht2)
for every ht2 ∈ H
t
2
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admits a solution. To start with, it is without loss to focus on ht2 with |Nt| = K. This is because
for every |N ′t | < K, there exists |N
′′
t | = K such that an agent who observes {as}s∈N ′′t has a Blackwell
more informative information structure compared to an agent who observes {as}s∈N ′
t
. As a result,
(B.20) is satisfied for all ht2 with |Nt| = K implies that (B.20) is satisfied for all h
t
2 with |Nt| ≤ K.
Second, the definition of M suggests that 2t > 2K
(
t
K
)
for every t ≥ M . This suggests that linear
system:
κ(ht2) · qt =
q∗ − π(ht2)
1− π(ht2)
for every ht2 ∈ H
t
2 with |Nt| = K (B.20)
is underdetermined. An important observation is that the following set of vectors:
{κ(ht2)}ht
2
∈Ht
2
with |Nt|=K
are convex independent. This is because (1) when s ∈ Nt, player 2 knows the value of χs and (2) when
s /∈ Nt, player 2’s belief about χs is not degenerate. Let κt be the coefficient matrix of linear system
(B.20). Convex independence of κ(ht2) suggests that the rank of the κt is
(
t
K
)
. Let
q˜t ≡
{q∗ − π(ht2)
1− π(ht2)
}
ht
2
∈Ht
2
with |Nt|=K
. (B.21)
Since (B.20) is underdetermined, the rank of the augmented matrix (κt, q˜t) is also
(
t
K
)
. The Rouche´-
Capelli theorem implies that (B.20) admits at least one solution.
Third, I show there exists a solution where each entry of qt belongs to the interval [ηq
∗, 1 − ηq∗].
This is because the RHS of (B.20) converges to q∗ as π(ht2) → 0, and linear system (B.20) admits
a solution qt = (q
∗, ..., q∗) when π(ht2) = 0. Proposition 10 in Fefferman and Kolla´r (2013) suggests
that the solution correspondence is continuous with respect to π(ht2). This suggests the existence of
η ∈ (0, 1/2) such that for every π(ht2) < ηq
∗, there exists a solution to (B.20) qt such that
||qt − (q
∗, ..., q∗)||L∞ < η.
When η is small enough, all entries of qt belong to the interval [q
∗η, 1− q∗η].
Fourth, I show by induction that π(ht2) < ηq
∗. In period t = M , since the strategic-type player 1
plays a∗ with probability at least ηq∗ at every history of the reputation-building phase before period
M and player 2’s prior belief attaches probability no more than π(η) to the commitment type, her
posterior belief attaches probability at most ηπ∗ to the commitment type given inequality (B.17). The
third step then implies the existence of qt such that q(χ
t) ∈ [ηq∗, 1−ηq∗] for every χt ∈ {0, 1}t. Suppose
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π(ht2) < ηq
∗ for every ht2 ∈ H
t
2 and every t ≤ T . The same reasoning implies that π(h
T+1
2 ) < ηq
∗ for
every hT+12 ∈ H
T+1
2 given that each player 2 observes at most K realizations among {at}
T
t=0. This
also suggests the existence of qT+1 with q(χ
T+1) ∈ [ηq∗, 1− ηq∗] for every χT+1 ∈ {0, 1}T+1.
Promising Keeping Constraint: I conclude the proof by verifying player 1’s promise keeping
constraint, i.e., the continuation play delivers strategic-type player 1 his continuation value in period 0,
which is u1(a
′, b′). Since strategic-type player 1 plays a∗ with probability at least ηq∗ in the reputation
building phase, and conditional on at−1 = a
∗, play transits to the reputation maintenance phase with
probability ρ, the equilibrium play belongs to the reputation maintenance phase or punishment phase
with probability 1 as t → ∞. This suggests that on the equilibrium path, play either converges to
(a∗, b∗) in every period, or (a′, b′) in every period, and player 1’s continuation value in those cases are
u1(a
∗, b∗) and u1(a
′, b′), respectively. This verifies the promise keeping constraints.
B.3 Proof of Theorem 3’: Generalized Coordination Games
First, consider the trivial case in which there exists a unique pure strategy Nash Equilibrium, i.e.,
a′ = a∗. Player 1’s payoff is u1(a
′, b′) in an equilibrium where player 1 plays a∗ at every history and
player 2 plays b∗ at every history.
Next, consider the nontrivial case in which a′′ = a∗ but a′ 6= a∗, i.e., the Stackelberg outcome is
a pure-strategy Nash Equilibrium in the stage game, but there also exists another stage-game Nash
Equilibrium which results in strictly lower payoff for player 1.
I construct an equilibrium that consists of three phases: a reputation building phase, a reputation
maintenance phase, and a punishment phase, which depends only on the history of player 2’s actions
that is commonly observed by both players. I only highlight the differences between this construction
and the one in Appendix B.2, in order to avoid repetition. In period t,
• play is in the reputation building phase if t = 0 or (b0, ..., bt−1) = (b
′, ..., b′);
• play is in the reputation maintenance phase if (1) there exists s ≤ t− 1 such that bs = b
∗∗, and
(2) bs∗+1 = b
∗ where s∗ is the smallest s ∈ N such that bs = b
∗∗.
• play is in the punishment phase if (1) there exists s ≤ t−1 such that bs = b
∗∗, and (2) bs∗+1 6= b
∗
where s∗ is the smallest s ∈ N such that bs = b
∗∗.
Play starts from the reputation building phase, and eventually ends up in the reputation maintenance
phase or the punishment phase. Different from the construction in Appendix B.2:
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1. The set of reputation maintenance phase histories is larger in the current construction. In
particular, player 2 only checks her predecessor’s action in the next period after b∗∗ occurs, and
as long as it is b∗, play remains in the reputation maintenance phase regardless of players’ actions
after period s∗ + 1.
2. Players’ strategies differ in the reputation maintenance phase, and player 2’s strategy is different
in the reputation building phase.
Players’ strategies in the punishment phase and player 1’s strategy in the reputation building phase
remain the same as in Appendix B.2, which I omit to avoid repetition. The differences are in players’
strategies in the reputation maintenance phase.
Reputation Maintenance Phase: Let s∗ be the smallest s such that bs = b
∗∗. At every history of
the reputation maintenance phase with t ≥ s∗ + 2, strategic-type player 1 plays a∗ and player 2 plays
b∗. In period s∗ + 1,
• If as∗ = a
∗, then strategic-type player 1 plays a∗ and player 2 plays b∗.
If as∗ 6= a
∗ and
ξs∗ > ξ
′
≡
1− δ
δ
·
u1(a
′, b′)− u1(a
∗, b′)
u1(a∗, b∗)− u1(a′, b′)
. (B.22)
then strategic-type player 1 plays a∗.
If as∗ 6= a
∗ and ξs∗ ≤ ξ
′
, then strategic-type player 1 plays a′ and player 2 plays b′.
Reputation Building Phase: Player 1’s strategy remains the same as Appendix B.2. Player 2s’
strategy differs in terms of ρ, the probability of playing b∗∗ in period t conditional on at−1 = a
∗ but
unconditional on the realization of Nt. This ρ is pinned down by the following equality:
V ′1 = (1− δ)u1(a
∗, ρb∗ + (1− ρ)b′) + δρu1(a
∗, b∗) + δ(1 − ρ)V ′1 , (B.23)
with
u1(a
′, b′) = (1− δ)u1(a
∗, b′) + δV ′1 .
The rest of the construction remains the same.
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B.4 Proof of Lemma B.2
Proof of Lemma B.2: According to (B.9), we have:
V1 = u1(a
∗, b∗)−
1− δ
δ
(
u1(a
′′, b∗)− u1(a
∗, b∗)
)
−
1− δ
δ
1− β
β
(
u1(a
′′, b′′)− u1(a
∗, b′′)
)
.
Plugging this into (B.4), we obtain:
1
1− β
(
u1(a
′′, b∗)− u1(a
∗, b∗)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡Y
+
1
β
(
u1(a
′′, b′′)− u1(a
∗, b′′)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡Z
=
δ
1− δ
(
u1(a
∗, b∗)− (1− δ)u1(a
∗, b′′)− δu1(a
′, b′)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡X
.
The two roots are given by:
β =
X + Z − Y ±
√
(X + Z − Y )2 − 4XZ
2X
(B.24)
When the stage-game features strict lack-of-commitment (see Definition 1), X > 0 and Y,Z ≥ 0. As
δ → 1, X → ∞ while Y and Z remain constant, and therefore, both roots are real. Moreover, the
larger of the two roots converge to 1. To show that it is strictly less than 1, it is equivalent to show
that: √
(X + Z − Y )2 − 4XZ < 2X − (X + Z − Y ),
which is equivalent to:
X2 + Y 2 + Z2 − 2XZ − 2Y Z − 2XY < X2 + Y 2 + Z2 − 2XZ − 2Y Z + 2XY.
The last inequality is true given that both X and Y are strictly positive. This establishes the existence
of a real root β that is strictly less than 1 and converges to 1 as δ → 1.
C Proof of Theorem 4
C.1 Proof of Theorem 4: Statement 1
For every public history ht, let g(ht) be the probability that player 2 plays b∗ at ht. Let g(ht, ωc)
be the probability that player 2 plays b∗ at ht conditional on player 1 is the commitment type. For
any public history ht ≡ {amax{0,t−K}, ..., at−1} = {a
∗, ...., a∗}, I derive a lower bound on: g(h
t,ωc)
g(ht) as a
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function of g(ht), or equivalently, an upper bound on
1− g(ht, ωc)
1− g(ht)
. (C.1)
Let A ≡ {a∗, a′} and S ≡ {s∗, s1, s2, ..., sm}. Let r(h
t) be the probability that a∗ is played at ht, let
τ(si)(h
t) be the probability that signal si occurs at h
t, and let p(si)(h
t) be the posterior probability
of a∗ conditional on observing si at h
t. I suppress the dependence on ht in order to simplify notation.
Since {b∗} = BR2(a
∗) and |A| = 2, we have the following two implications:
1. there exists a cutoff belief p∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that player 2 has a strict incentive to play b∗ after
observing si if and only if p(si) > p
∗.
2. there exists a constant C ∈ R+ such that 1− r ≥ C(1− g).
According to the first implication, it is without loss of generality to label the signal realizations such
that p(s1) ≥ p(s2) ≥ ... ≥ p(sm), and moreover, there exists k ∈ {1, 2, ...,m} such that player 2 plays
b∗ for sure after observing s1, ..., sk−1, and does not play b
∗ otherwise.26 Therefore,
r(1− f(s∗|a∗)) =
m∑
i=1
τ(si)p(si), 1− r =
m∑
i=1
τ(si)(1− p(si)), and
m∑
i=k
τ(si) = 1− g.
Using the fact that p(s1) ≥ p(s2) ≥ ... ≥ p(sm), we know that:
∑k−1
i=1 τ(si)p(si)∑k−1
i=1 τ(si)(1− p(si))
≥
r(1− f(s∗|a∗))
1− r
≥
∑m
i=k τ(si)p(si)∑m
i=k τ(si)(1 − p(si))
. (C.2)
As a result,
m∑
i=k
τ(si)p(si) ≤
r(1− f(s∗|a∗))
1− rf(s∗|a∗)
(1− g), (C.3)
and
m∑
i=k
τ(si)(1− p(si)) ≥
1− r
1− rf(s∗|a∗)
(1− g). (C.4)
Therefore,
1− g(ωc)
1− g
≤
1− f(s∗|a∗)
1− rf(s∗|a∗)
, (C.5)
26Ignoring the possibility that player 2 plays a mixed action following certain signal realizations is without loss of
generality in proving the current theorem. This is because when player 2 mixes between n actions after one signal
realization, we can split this signal realization into n signal realizations with the same posterior belief, such that player
2 plays a pure action following each of these signal realizations.
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Using the second implication, namely, r ≤ 1− C(1− g), we have:
1− g(ωc)
1− g
≤
1− f(s∗|a∗)
1− f(s∗|a∗) + Cf(s∗|a∗)(1 − g)
. (C.6)
Similarly, the lower bound on the likelihood ratio with which b∗ occurs is given by:
g(ωc)
g
≥ 1 +
f(s∗|a∗)(1− g(ht))
g − rf(s∗|a∗)
≥ 1 +
f(s∗|a∗)(1 − g)
g − f(s∗|a∗)(1− C(1− g))
(C.7)
Let β(ht) ∈ ∆(B) be the distribution over player 2’s action at ht, and let β(ht, ωc) ∈ ∆(B) be the
distribution over player 2’s action at ht conditional on player 1 being the commitment type. Inequalities
(C.6) and (C.7) imply the following lower bound on the KL divergence between β(ht) and β(ht, ωc):
d
(
β(ht)
∣∣∣β(ht, ωc)) ≤ L(1− g(ht)). (C.8)
The Pinsker’s inequality implies that L(·) is of the magnitude (1− g(ht))2.
This lower bound on the KL divergence bounds the speed of learning at ht from below, as a function
of the probability with which player 2 at ht does not play b∗. This implies a lower bound on the speed
of learning when player 2 in the future observes b∗ in period t, given that he knew that the probability
with which player 2 plays b∗ at ht is no more than g(ht). However, unlike models with unbounded
memory, future player 2’s information does not nest that of player 2’s in period t. This is because
future player 2s may not observe {at−K , ..., at−1}, and hence, cannot interpret the meaning of bt in
the same way as player 2 in period t does.
For every s, t ∈ N with s > t, I provide a lower bound on the informativeness of bt about player
1’s type from the perspective of player 2 who arrives in period s, as a function of the informativeness
of bt (about player 1’s type) from the perspective of player 2 who arrives in period t. This together
with (C.8) establishes a lower bound on the informativeness of bt from the perspective of future player
2s as a function of the probability with which b∗ is not being played. Applying the result in Gossner
(2011), one obtains the commitment payoff theorem.
Let π(ht) be player 2’s belief about ω at ht before observing the period t signal st. By definition,
π(h0) = π0. For every strategy profile σ, let P
σ be the probability measure over H induced by σ, let
Pσ,ω
c
be the probability measure induced by σ conditional on player 1 being the commitment type,
and let Pσ,ω
s
be the probability measure induced by σ conditional on player 1 being the strategic type.
One can the write the posterior likelihood ratio as the product of the likelihood ratio of the signals
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observed in each period:
π(ht)
1− π(ht)
/ π0
1− π0
=
Pσ,ω
c
(b0)
Pσ,ωs(b0)
·
Pσ,ω
c
(b1|b0)
Pσ,ωs(b1|b0)
· ... ·
Pσ,ω
c
(bt−1|bt−2, ..., b0)
Pσ,ωs(bt−1|bt−2, ..., b0)
·
Pσ,ω
c
(at−K , ..., at−1|bt, bt−1, ..., b0)
Pσ,ωs(at−K , ..., at−1|bt, bt−1, ..., b0)
(C.9)
Furthermore, for every ǫ > 0 and every t, we know that:
Pσ,ω
c
(
πσ(b0, b1, ...bt−1) < ǫπ0
)
≤ ǫ
1− π0
1− π0ǫ
, (C.10)
in which πσ(b0, b1, ...bt−1) ∈ ∆(Ω) is player 2’s belief about player 1’s type after observing (b0, ..., bt−1)
but before observing player 1’s actions and st. For every ǫ > 0, let ρ
∗(ǫ) be defined as:
ρ∗(ǫ) ≡
ǫπ0
1− Cǫ
. (C.11)
Next, if πσ(b0, b1, ...bt−1) ≥ ǫπ0, and player 2 in period t believes that bt = b
∗ occurs with probability
less than 1 − ǫ after observing (at−K , ..., at−1) = (a
∗, ..., a∗), then under probability measure Pσ, the
probability of {at−K , ..., at−1} = {a
∗, ..., a∗} conditional on (b0, ..., bt−1) is at least ρ
∗(ǫ).
To see this, suppose towards a contradiction that the probability with which (at−K , ..., at−1) =
(a∗, ..., a∗) is strictly less than ρ∗(ǫ) conditional on (b0, ..., bt−1). According to (C.11), after observing
(at−K , ..., at−1) = (a
∗, ..., a∗) in period t and given that πσ(b0, b1, ...bt−1) ≥ ǫπ0, π(h
t) attaches prob-
ability strictly more than 1 − Cǫ to the commitment type. As a result, player 2 in period t believes
that a∗ is played with probability at least 1− Cǫ at ht. This contradicts presumption that she plays
b∗ with probability less than 1− ǫ.
Next, I study the believed distribution of bt from the perspective of player 2 in period s in the
event that πσ(b0, b1, ...bt−1) ≥ ǫπ0. Let P(σ, t, s) ∈ ∆(∆(A
K)) be player 2’s signal structure in period
s(≥ t) about {at−K , ..., at−1} under equilibrium σ. For every small enough η > 0, given that P(σ, t)
attaches probability at least ρ∗(ǫ) to {at−K , ..., at−1} = {a
∗, ..., a∗}, the probability with which P(σ, t, s)
attaches to the event that {at−K , ..., at−1} = {a
∗, a∗, ..., a∗} occurs with probability less than ηρ∗(ǫ)
conditional on {at−K , ..., at−1} = {a
∗, a∗, ..., a∗} is bounded from above by:
ηρ∗(ǫ)(1 − ρ∗(ǫ))
(1− ηρ∗(ǫ))ρ∗(ǫ)
= η
1− ρ∗(ǫ)
1− ρ∗(ǫ)η
. (C.12)
Let g(t|hs) be player 2’s belief about the probability with which b∗ is played in period t when she
observes hs. Let g(t, ωc|hs) be her belief about the probability with which b∗ is played in period t
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conditional on player 1 being committed. The conclusions in (C.6) and (C.7) also apply in this setting,
namely,
1− g(t, ωc|hs)
1− g(t|hs)
≤
1− f(s∗|a∗)
1− f(s∗|a∗) + Cf(s∗|a∗)(1− g(t|hs))
(C.13)
and
g(t, ωc|hs)
g(t|hs)
≥ 1 +
f(s∗|a∗)(1 − g(t|hs))
g(t|hs)− f(s∗|a∗)(1− C(1− g(t|hs)))
(C.14)
Whenever player 2 in period s believes that {at−K , ..., at−1} = {a
∗, a∗, ..., a∗} occurs with probability
more than η · ρ∗(ǫ), we have:
g(t|hs) ≤ 1− ǫηρ∗. (C.15)
Applying (C.15) to (C.13) and (C.14), we obtain a lower bound on the KL divergence between
g(t, ωc|hs) and g(t|hs). This is the lower bound on the speed with which player 2 at hs will learn
through bt = b
∗ about player 1’s type, which applies to all events except for one that occurs with
probability less than η 1−ρ
∗
1−ρ∗η . Therefore, for every ǫ and π0, there exists δ such that when δ > δ, the
strategic player 1’s payoff by playing a∗ in every period is at least:
(
1− ǫ− ǫ
1− π0
1− π0ǫ
)
u1(a
∗, b∗) +
(
ǫ+ ǫ
1− π0
1− π0ǫ
)
min
a,b
u1(a, b) − ǫ. (C.16)
Taking ǫ→ 0 and δ → 1, (C.16) implies the commitment payoff theorem.
C.2 Proof of Theorem 4: Statement 2
Recall the definitions of (a∗, b∗) and (a′, b′) in the proof of Theorem 1. I omit the trivial case in
which a∗ = a′, i.e., a∗ is player 1’s action in his worst pure-strategy Nash Equilibrium. I focus on the
interesting case in which a∗ 6= a′. Since |A| = 2, we have A = {a∗, a′}. Let
l∗(f) ≡ max
s∈S
f(s|a∗)
f(s|a′)
(C.17)
Consider the construction in the proof of Theorem 1 with one modification: the overall probability
with which player 1 plays a∗ is:
q̂ ≡
q∗
q∗ + (1− q∗)l∗(f)
, (C.18)
and the probability with which he plays a′ is 1 − q̂. Let π0 = q̂
K . Player 2 has an incentive to play
b′ in the reputation building phase, regardless of her observation of player 1’s action in the past K
periods, and regardless of the signal she receives about player 1’s action in the current period. When
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K ≥ 1, the rest of the constructive proof follows from that of Theorem 1. When K = 0, strategic-type
player 1 plays a′ at every history and player 2 plays b′ at every history. Such a strategy profile is an
equilibrium when the prior probability of commitment type is small enough.
C.3 Proof of Theorem 4’
For every α ∈ ∆(A) and β : S → ∆(B), let π(α, β) ∈ ∆(B) be the distribution over b induced by (α, β).
When players’ payoffs are monotone-supermodular and f is unboundedly informative about a∗ and
satisfies MLRP, I establish the existence of C > 0 such that for every α ∈ ∆(A) with a∗ ∈ supp(α), and
every β : S → ∆(B) that is player 2’s stage-game best reply against α after observing the realization
of s, if π(α, β)[b∗] < 1− ε, then
d
(
π(α, β)
∥∥∥π(a∗, β)) > Cε2. (C.19)
The rest of the proof follows from that of Theorem 4 in Appendix C.1 and is omitted to avoid repetition.
Let A be the set of actions that are strictly higher than a∗ and let A be the set of actions that
are strictly lower than a∗. Since f is unboundedly informative about a∗, there exists s∗ ∈ S such that
f(s∗|a) > 0 if and only if a = a∗. Let S be the set of signal realizations that are strictly higher than
s∗ and let S be the set of signal realizations that are strictly lower than s∗. Since f satisfies MLRP,
for every s ∈ S, f(s|a) > 0 only if a  a∗, and for every s ∈ S, f(s|a) > 0 only if a  a∗.
For every α ∈ ∆(A), let α′ ∈ ∆(A) be the distribution over A conditional on a 6= a∗. If supp(α) ∩
A 6= {∅}, then let α ∈ ∆(A) be the distribution over A conditional on a ∈ supp(α)∩A; if supp(α)∩A 6=
{∅}, then let α ∈ ∆(A) be the distribution over A conditional on a ∈ supp(α)∩A. By definition, there
exists λ ∈ [0, 1] such that α′ = λα + (1 − λ)α. When π(α, β)[b∗] < 1− ε, either α is well-defined and
π(α, β)[b∗] < 1, or α is well-defined and π(α, β)[b∗] < 1, or both. Since players’ payoffs are monotone-
supermodular, and β best replies against α, there exist s ∈ S and s ∈ S such that β(s)[b∗] = 1 only if
s ≻ s ≻ s, and β(s)[b∗] > 0 only if s  s  s.
Suppose toward a contradiction that d
(
π(α, β)
∥∥π(a∗, β)) = 0, then d(π(α′, β)∥∥π(a∗, β)) = 0, which
suggests:
λ
(
β(s)[b∗] · f(s|α) +
∑
s≻s
f(s|α)
)
= β(s)[b∗] · f(s|a∗) +
∑
s≻s
f(s|a∗) (C.20)
and
(1− λ)
(
β(s)[b∗] · f(s|α) +
∑
s≺s
f(s|α)
)
= β(s)[b∗] · f(s|a∗) +
∑
s≺s
f(s|a∗). (C.21)
REFERENCES 58
Since f(s∗|a) > 0 if and only if a = a∗, (C.20) and (C.21) together imply that either
λ
(
(1− β(s)[b∗]) · f(s|α) +
∑
s≻s≻s∗
f(s|α)
)
> (1− β(s)[b∗]) · f(s|a∗) +
∑
s≻s≻s∗
f(s|a∗) (C.22)
or
(1− λ)
(
(1− β(s)[b∗]) · f(s|α) +
∑
s≺s≺s∗
f(s|α)
)
> (1− β(s)[b∗]) · f(s|a∗) +
∑
s≺s≺s∗
f(s|a∗). (C.23)
If (C.22) is true, then (C.20) and (C.22) violate MLRP of f . If (C.23) is true, then (C.21) and (C.23)
violate MLRP of f . Since the number of signal realizations is finite, there exists C > 0 such that
||π(α, β) − π(a∗, β)|| > C2 ε whenever π(α, β)[b
∗] < 1 − ε. The Pinsker’s inequality then implies that
d
(
π(α, β)
∥∥∥π(a∗, β)) > Cε2.
C.4 Bounded Informativeness vs Full Support
I provide an example that explains why the full support condition in statement 2 of Theorem 4’ cannot
be replaced by f being boundedly informative about a∗. Players’ stage game payoffs are given by:
- b∗ b′
a 1, 4 −2, 0
a∗ 2, 1 −1, 0
a 3,−2 0, 0
Let S ≡ {s, s∗, s}, with f(s|a) = 2/3, f(s∗|a) = 1/3, f(s|a∗) = 1/3, f(s∗|a∗) = 2/3, and f(s|a) = 1.
One can verify that players’ stage-game payoffs are monotone-supermodular when player 1’s actions
are ranked according to a ≻ a∗ ≻ a, and player 2’s actions are ranked according to b∗ ≻ b′. When
signal realizations are ranked according to s ≻ s∗ ≻ s, f satisfies MLRP. It is easy to show that player
1 can guarantee payoff 2 in every Bayes Nash Equilibrium. The reason is: if player 1 plays a∗ in every
period, player 2 observes signal s∗ or s, and has a strict incentive to play b∗. As a result, player 1’s
payoff from playing a∗ in every period is at least 2.
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